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Incest Statutes and the
Fundamental Right of Marriage:
Is Oedipus Free to Marry?
CAROLYN S. BRATT*
The U.S. Supreme Court has found that the right to marry is a constitu-
tionally protected right.' That right is restricted, however, by state incest
statutes which impede marriage between adults by making some choices
of a marriage partner illegal. The constitutional validity of modern state
incest statutes is difficult to analyze because of shifting definitions, reflex-
ive fears, ambivalent attitudes, and underlying facile generalizations.
The mere word "incest" triggers strong feelings of revulsion in most
people. Therefore, any a priori labeling of a marriage as incestuous tends
to preclude objective thought about the permissibility of the particular
form of the marriage prohibition at issue. Such revulsion stems largely
from the confusion of incest with sexual abuse of children. This confusion
is not limited to the general public, but extends to the courts as well.
When criminal incest statutes are invoked, the overwhelming majority
of prosecutions are for sexual intercourse between relatives within the
statutory definition of incest, not for attempted marriages between such
relatives. In a random sampling of 101 criminal appellate court decisions
on cases alleging violation of criminal incest laws, all 101 cases involved
prosecutions for sexual intercourse. More importantly, in 96 cases in
which the ages of the incest participants were revealed, 94 involved an
adult defendant and a minor child victim. Finally, 94 cases also involved
father-daughter, father-adoptive daughter, or stepfather-stepdaughter
sexual relationships. As these figures indicate, state incest statutes have
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A., 1965, State University of New York at
Albany; J.D., 1974, Syracuse University. The author gives special recognition for research
work to Allison 1. Connelly, J.D., 1983, University of Kentucky, and for editorial sugges-
tions to Karen Greenwell, third-year law student, University of Kentucky, and Carolyn
Dye, J.D., 1976, University of Kentucky.
1. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1978); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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been utilized primarily for prohibiting and for punishing sexual abuse of
children.
Nothing in this article is to imply that sexual abuse of children by adults
is not a legitimate and overriding concern of the state. Nevertheless, one
must understand the distinction between state incest statutes as a vehicle
for prohibiting and punishing sexual abuse of minors and state incest
statutes as a marriage prohibition for adults. The rightful condemnation
of the intrinsically abusive nature of adult-child sexual relationships must
not be used to shield incest statutes prohibiting marriage between certain
adults from an objective evaluation.
Another major obstacle to any attempt to analyze the constitutional
validity of state incest statutes is the lack of a constant definition for the
incest concept. Although the incest taboo is present in almost every
society, the precise relationships within which marriage is prohibited vary
not only state to state but also crossculturally and transhistorically.2 The
most common nucleus of forbidden relationships is parent-child and
sibling-sibling marriage, but beyond that generalization, the content of
the taboo lacks uniformity. A typical judicial condemnation of incest
included emotion laden phrases: "[incest] violates the voice of nature,
degrades the family, [and ] offends decency and morals. . . ." However,
the marriage which was condemned by these phrases was that of a
nephew marrying his uncle's widow.' Such a union certainly is not the
type called to mind by the phrase "incestuous marriage." Moreover, in
most states today, such a marriage does not meet the legal definition of
incest.
This difficulty in defining the concept of incest is exacerbated by the
considerable ambivalence surrounding the incest taboo. Such ambiva-
lence is exemplified by the word "incest" itself, as it symbolizes con-
flicting images of "sacred" as well as "unclean" and "forbidden." 5
Numerous examples from a variety of cultural sources disclose instances
where incest was unpunished, uncondemned, and even rewarded. In
Sophocles' version of the Oedipus legend, when Oedipus discovers he has
killed his father and married his mother, Jocasta, there is much suffering:
he is blinded, his wife-mother commits suicide, and their four children
2. For example, sibling marriage was practiced in E.ypt, aboriginal Hawaii, and Incan
Peru. R. E. L. MASTERS, PAITERNS OF INCEST 235 (1963). Ancient Persia had no incest taboo
and close relative marriages were approved. H. MAISCH, INCEST 22 (C. Bearne trans. 1972).
During the Middle Ages in Europe, sixth cousins were forbidden to marry. MASTERS, supra
at 27. In some preliterate societies, marriage to a parallel cousin (a child of the mother's
sister or a child of the father's brother) is forbidden as incestuous, but marriage to a cross
cousin (a child of the mother's brother or a child of the father's sister) is not forbidden and
may be mandatory. Id. at 234. Today, Swedish law permits marriage between half-siblings,
and French law permits aunt-nephew and uncle-niece marriages. M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW
AND FAMILY 40 (1977).
3. Beggs v. State, 55 Ala. 108, 112 (1876).
4. Osinach v. Watkins, 180 So. 577. 580 (Ala. 1938).
5. H. MAISCH. supra note 2, at 57.
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die. However, in the earlier Homeric version, neither Oedipus nor
Jocasta are subject to any suffering or punishment from the gods or from
their self-knowledge.' Similarly, in Biblical literature, the incest condem-
nation found in Leviticus is not visited upon Abraham's marriage to his
half-sister, Sarah; to the contrary, the marriage was blessed."
The incest motif itself persists as a tradition. Alleged public horror
combined with obvious fascination for the theme extends in an unbroken
line from the myths of preliterate peoples8 to contemporary literature. 9
Any examination of contemporary incest statutes as a limitation on the
right to marry must be sensitive to the historically ambivalent reactions to
acts in contravention of the prohibition.
Finally, myths and half-truths about the genetic effects of incestuous
matings on the offspring represent another impediment to an analysis of
the constitutional validity of contemporary incest statutes as marriage
prohibitions. Although directly contradicted by current scientific knowl-
edge of genetic inheritance, common knowledge continues to teach that
incestuous unions cause mentally and/or physically defective offspring."0
Once one recognizes these analytical difficulties-reflexive fears, shift-
ing definitions of incest itself, ambivalent attitudes, and facile underlying
generalizations-one can begin to rationally evaluate the validity of state
incest statutes in the light of the constitutional right to marry. After
making such an analysis, this author has concluded that neither the civil
marriage bar nor the criminal bar against incestuous acts serves any valid
purpose which cannot be better served by statutes which do not impinge
on the constitutional right to marry.
I. The Fundamental Right to Marry
A right of "privacy" is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. It is, how-
ever, surrounded by a maelstrom of differing opinions as to its constitu-
6. R. E. L. MASTERS, supra note 2, at 11.
7. The story of Lot is another example of biblical incest which was not condemned. Lot
fathered a child by both of his daughters. The child of the elder daughter was the ancestor of
the Moabites while the younger daughter's son was the ancestor of the Ammonites. Genesis
20:1-38.
8. Greek mythology contains numerous examples of incestuous activity by the gods. Zeus
raped his mother, Rhea, and married his sister, Hera. Zeus was born of the union between
Rhea and her brother Chronus. According to Egyptian myths, Isis and Nephthys, two
sisters, married their brothers, Osiris and Set. Nut, the goddess of the sky, married her twin
brother Geb. In Vedic mythology Yama, King of the Dead, married his sister, Yami.
According to Japanese mythology, the world creators, Izanagi and Izanami, were brother
and sister and invented sexual intercourse. R. E. L. MASTERS, supra note 2, at 10-12.
9. The incest motif in literature appears in three forms. One form is the unconscious
perpetration of incest as exemplified by Sophocles' Oedipus. The second form, conscious
perpetration of incest, is rare, but is found in Marquis de Sade's Eugenie de Franval. Finally,
the subconscious incest wish is frequently expressed in contemporary literature such as
Tennessee Williams's Cat on a Hot Tin Roof, Eugene O'Neill's Mourning Becomes Electra,
and D. H. Lawrence's Sons and Lovers. H. MAISCH, supra note 2, at 12-21.
10. Historical examples of close relative mating which did not produce defective offspring
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tional source, its nature, and its extent." This right of privacy encom-
passes much more than the explicit constitutional guarantees such as
freedom from bodily restraints and freedom from unreasonable gov-
ernmental searches and seizures. For example, in a long series of cases
beginning in the 1920's, the U.S. Supreme Court extended constitutional
protection to a right of parental decision making in the rearing of
children. 2 Further, the right of privacy protected by the Constitution
against unwarranted state intrusion also includes a right of privacy in
matters of procreation. The Constitution limits the power of government
to determine who may bear children'3 and to interfere with an individual's
choice to have or not to have offspring." Even the government's power to
define what constitutes a family is circumscribed by the constitutionally
protected right of privacy. 5
At the heart of the right of privacy is the right of choice in marriage and
family relationships. 6 In Meyer v. Nebraska7 the Supreme Court upheld
the parents' right to have their children instructed in the German lan-
guage. The Court noted that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment "denotes... the right of the individual to marry, establish a
home and bring up children."'" In Skinner v. Oklahoma9 the Supreme
are Cleopatra, the child of a brother-sister union, and Moses, the child of an aunt-nephew
mating. Today, both unions are forbidden in most states.
11. Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court recognizing a right of privacy in certain types of
decision making are grounded in substantive due process notions emanating from the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
procedural due process notions embodied in the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); the First Amend-
ment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and the Ninth Amendment, id. at 496
(Goldberg, J., concurring). Two recent examples of the debate over the nature and extent
of the right of privacy are Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 463 (1983) and
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1979-80).
12. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upheld parents' right to have their
children taught German); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(upheld parents'
right to have their children attend nonpublic schools); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972)(upheld right of Amish parents to remove their children from state compulsory
education after the eighth grade); Stanley v. Illinois, 414 U.S. 632 (1974)(protected unwed
father's right to the custody, care, and nurture of his children).
13. Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535 (1942)(invalidated a state statute which allowed
sterilization of habitual criminals). But see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)(upheld a
statute which permitted sterilization of mentally retarded persons).
14. The Constitution protects the decision to use contraceptive devices to prevent
pregnancy. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The decision to
terminate a pregnancy by an abortion is also constitutionally protected. Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Conversely, the decision to bear a child
cannot be subjected to unwarranted state intrusion. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974).
15. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
16. J. NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSlIrUrONAL LAW 629 (1978).
17. 262 U.S. 390.
18. Id. at 399.
19. 316 U.S. 535.
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Court invalidated a state statute which permitted sterilization of certain
habitual criminals. The Court premised its decision on the fundamental
nature of the right to marry and procreate. In Griswold v. Connecticut'
the Supreme Court struck down a state statute which forbade the use of
contraceptive devices by married couples. The Court said that marital
privacy is a "privacy older than the Bill of Rights ... ."22 It went on to
describe the right to marry, to raise a family and to have marital privacy as
being "of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights speci-
fically protected [by the Constitution]. "21 In Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion v. LaFleur," a mandatory leave provision for pregnant school
teachers was invalidated by the Supreme Court because of the "freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life .... I
Because of the "basic position of the marriage relationship in this
society's hierarchy of values . . ." and the state monopolization of the
means for dissolving the marriage relationship, the Supreme Court, in
Bodie v. Connecticut,6 held that a state may not deny access to its courts
to indigents who seek a divorce. The Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis
2 7
characterized the privacy cases as involving the individual's indepen-
dence in making certain kinds of important decisions-"matters relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships and child-
rearing and education."I In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,' the Court
invalidated a zoning ordinance which imposed criminal sanctions on a
grandmother who was living with her son, the son's child, and another
grandchild, the son of a deceased daughter. In recognizing that this
non-nuclear "family" was entitled to protection from such unwarranted
state intrusion, the Court reaffirmed its long-standing recognition of
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life."'
The institution of marriage and the marriage relationship played a
central role in the Supreme Court's evolving notion of a right of privacy,
constitutionally protected from unwarranted state intrusion. There are,
however, only three contemporary cases-Loving v. Virginia,3 Califano
v. Jobst,3" and Zablocki v. RedhaiP3 -which specifically address the na-
ture of the right to marry.
In Loving, the Supreme Court invalidated a state antimiscegenation
20. Id. at 541.
21. 381 U.S. 479.
22. Id. at 486.
23. Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
24. 414 U.S. 632.
25. Id. at 639-40.
26. 401 U.S. 371.
27. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
28. Id. at 713.
29. 431 U.S. 494.
30. Id. at 499.
31. 388 U.S. 1.
32. 434 U.S. 47.
33. 434 U.S. 374.
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statute which had been enacted to prohibit and punish interracial mar-
riages. The Court found that the statute violated both the equal protec-
tion clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Because the statute was based on a racial classification, to satisfy the
equal protection clause, the state was required but failed to establish a
compelling purpose to justify the classifications. The statute also violated
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Court
chose not to declare fundamental the right to marry. It characterized the
freedom to marry as a "vital personal right,'"' but held the due process
violation to be the racial classification denying this freedom. Since this
decision turned on the racial character of the classification, the Court's
opinion sheds little, if any, light on the constitutional dimensions of the
right to marry. The decision does make clear, however, that, although
regulation of the marriage relation like other domestic relations regula-
tion is an area long regarded as properly within the state's police power,
the state's power to regulate marriage is not unlimited. -
Twelve years after the Loving decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided two cases involving the right to marry. In Califano v. Jobst, a
unanimous Court upheld certain provisions of the Social Security Act
(SSA) against an attack based on the adverse impact the statutory provi-
sions would have on the challenger's choice of a marriage partner."
However, in Zablocki v. Redhail an almost unanimous Court struck
down a state statute which prohibited the challenger's decision to marry.'
Juxtaposition of these two cases clarifies the Court's view of the right to
marry. The statute in Redhail forbade marriage without court approval to
any resident of Wisconsin who had minor children not in the resident's
custody whom the parent was obligated by court order or judgment to
support. Moreover, court approval could not be granted absent a show-
ing that the support obligation had been met and that the children
covered by the support order were not then, and were not likely to
become, public charges.' Jobst involved provisions in the SSA which
terminated the secondary benefits paid to a disabled dependent child of a
Social-Security-eligible wage earner when that child married an ineligible
disabled person. "
The Court in Redhail reaffirmed the fundamental character of the right
to marry. It specifically acknowledged that its earlier decisions protecting
34. 388 U.S. at 12.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 7.
37. 434 U.S. at 58.
38. 434 U.S. 374. There were six opinions in the case. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion
of the Court and was joined by Chief Justice Burger. Justices Brennan, White, and
Blackmun. The Chief Justice also separately concurred. Id. at 391. Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Stephens wrote separate concurrences. Id. at 391, 396, 403. Only Justice Rehnquist
dissented. He would have sustained the statute. Id. at 407.
39. Id. at 375.
40. 434 U.S. 47, 50-51.
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the right of individual choice concerning procreation, childbirth, child
rearing and family relationships logically required the recognition of a
constitutionally protected right to marry. "It would make little sense to
recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and
not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the
foundation of the family in our society." 4'
Because the right to marry is similar to other individual choices falling
within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy, this right does not
protect against every kind of state intrusion into the individual's decision-
making process."- The states have long had the power to regulate the
incidents of, or prerequisites to, marriage as embodiments of a 6ollective
societal judgment. Consequently, one must carefully consider every chal-
lenge of a state statute for impermissibly infringing on an individual's
right to marry. If a state regulation was meant to directly interfere with
the exercise of an individual's choice to marry, the statute must be
supported by a sufficiently important state interest and must be closely
tailored to effectuate only that interest. ' Whereas, if a statute, intended
to accomplish some other purpose, only incidentally and insubstantially
affects an individual's decision to marry, the Court will subject it to only
minimal scrutiny as to its purpose and effect.'
The Wisconsin statute at issue on Redhail absolutely prohibited non-
custodial parents from remarrying if they lacked the financial means to
meet their support obligation to their noncustodial children and if they
could not prove that their children would not become public charges.
Moreover, the Court found that the statute was sufficiently burdensome
so as to effectively coerce even those noncustodial parents who could
satisfy the requirements of the statute to forego their right to marry. 5 In
contrast, the statutory provisions at issue in Jobst were not intended to,
and did not, directly impede a recipient's decision to marry. The recipient
of these disability benefits was at all time free to marry. The provisions of
the statute only incidentally affected the recipient's decision-making
process by imposing an economic burden on the choice to marry another
disabled person who was not receiving Social Security benefits. The
Court determined that because of the availability of other federal ben-
efits, the withdrawal of the Social Security benefits for this reason did not
significantly discourage the recipient's decision to marry.' In Jobst, then,
41. 434 U.S. at 386.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 388.
44. Id. at 387 n.12.
45. Id. at 387.
46. Redhail and Jobst establish that significant interferences with the decision to marry
trigger a more exacting scrutiny of the statute. The characterization of a statute as a
significant interference with the right to marry turns on the directness and the substantiality
of the interference. For a discussion of the difficulties in applying this test, see Developments
in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1251-55 (1980).
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the Court subjected the statutory provisions to only minimal scrutiny as
to their purpose and fit, whereas in Redhail the Court invoked a higher
standard of review and found the statute wanting.' 7
There is no ready method of analysis available to aid courts when a
statute is challenged as an impermissible interference with the indi-
vidual's decision to marry, and this comes as no surprise. The courts face
similar problems when any new claim of constitutional protection for
individual decision making is asserted as another facet of the right of
privacy.' 8 Nor should it be surprising that the courts reach different
47. The Court's application of a higher standard of review in Redhail meant the state had
to show a legitimate and substantial state purpose was served by the statute. The state
asserted that the permission-to-marry proceeding provided the state with an opportunity to
counsel marriage applicants concerning the necessity of fulfilling their support obligation for
out-of-custody children. Also, the state claimed that the statute was a device for safe-
guarding the welfare of out-of-custody children. The Court accepted both alleged purposes
as legitimate and substantial but clearly indicated that such an infringement on the right to
marry is impermissible absent a substantial, legitimate purpose.
The Court put aside the usual deference it gives to legislative judgments as to the means
by which a particular purpose is achieved. Instead, the Court closely examined the fit
between the two purposes of the statute. The Court determined that the state's interest in
counseling marriage applicants was not served by the statute. The statute neither required
nor provided any counseling of applicants. Moreover, even if counseling did take place,
once the counseling was completed the state purpose had been fulfilled. Therefore, the
denial of permission to marry after counseling was not justifiable.
The Court had difficulty finding any connection between the state interest in safeguarding
the welfare of out-of-custody children and the requirements of the statute. If the statute was
intended to be a "collection device" for support payments, it was impermissible as applied
to those marriage applicants who were truly unable to pay. The applicant was forever
refused permission to marry although the children's welfare would never be advanced
because the marriage applicant had no funds to pay. Also, the state has devices for collecting
child support payments, such as wage assignments and civil contempt proceedings, which
are at least as effective as the statute, but do not infringe upon the right to marry.
Similarly, the state interest in compelling parents to provide sufficient support to keep
their out-of-custody children from becoming public charges is accomplished more directly
by adjusting the amount paid under child support orders. Therefore, this indirect method of
compelling adequate support payments, impinging as it does on the applicant's right to
marry, is impermissible.
Finally, the statute could not be sustained as a method of protecting the children's welfare
by preventing the marriage applicant from incurring new financial obligations. The statute
only prevented applicants from incurring new financial commitments arising out of mar-
riage. As the applicant was not prevented from incurring additional financial obligations
arising out of nonmarital contracts, it was fatally underinclusive. The statute was also
overinclusive because it denied applicants the right to marry in those instances wherein the
marriage would actually improve, but would not completely satisfy, the applicant's ability to
fulfill prior support obligations. 434 U.S. at 388-90.
48. Justice Harlan recognized this problem in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman:
Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against a back-
ground of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and histor-
ically developed. Though we exercise limited and sharply restrained judgment, yet
there is no "mechanical yardstick," no "mechanical answer." The decision of an
apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted
principles and criteria. The new decision must take its place in relation to what went
before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come. [Citation omitted.] 367 U.S. 497,
544 (1961).
For an example of this process, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(right of
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conclusions as to the permissibility of state intrusions into the constitu-
tionally protected area of individual decision making. ' Any court deci-
sion involving a claim of an impermissible state intrusion into the pro-
tected area of choice requires a sensitive balancing of the competing
individual and state interests.'
In the Jobst and Redhail cases the Supreme Court achieved this balance
by manipulating the standard of review. The Court recognized that some
state regulations "press more heavily" on marriage choices than do
others.' The more burdensome the statute, the more the state must show
to justify its restrictions.' This is especially true when the state makes the
choice an illegal act or imposes significant deprivation on the choice."
Unexamined or reflexive generalizations, conclusory judgments or spec-
ulations unsupported by evidence have no place in this balancing to
determine whether a particular individual's choice to marry is constitu-
tionally protected. Just as the Supreme Court recognized that the logical
married adults to purchase contraceptive devices); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972)(right of unmarried adults to purchase contraceptive devices).
49. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the state's power to regulate
children's employment prevailed over parental assertions of a right to control their children.
The Court held that forbidding street solicitation by children was a permissible state means
of curtailing the crippling effects of child labor. But, cf., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). There the Court recognized the state's legitimate and important interest in assuring
the education of children. However, because of the intense convictions of Amish parents
that secondary education was at odds with their religious faith and was an infringement on
their parental prerogatives as to value transmission, it was impermissible for the state to
require Amish children to attend school until age sixteen. Id.
50. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum
which broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints ... and which also recognizes, that a reasonable and sensitive
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state
needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. Karst, supra note 11, at 628. The Court applied the minimal standard of review in
Jobst, 434 U.S. at 54, 56, whereas in Redhail, 434 U.S. at 383, 386, it applied a heightened
scrutiny to the statute in issue. The Court has achieved a sliding scale, or balancing test, by
manipulating the standard-of-review in resolving other claims of state intrusion into areas of
individual choice. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(decision to have an abor-
tion) and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)(decision to live with
non-nuclear family) with Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976)(decision to have a certain
hair style).
52. It is unimportant that at different times the Court uses the rhetoric of the First and
Ninth Amendments or the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment in deciding individual choice cases. An examination of what the Court has
done reveals it has been balancing the interest of the state and the individual interest. When
the individual interest at stake is deemed important and the state regulation significantly
impacts on the individual's choice process, the Court requires a very important state interest
and a close fit between the means and the purpose in order to sustain the statute. It is
suggested that the Court is engaged in judicial evasion because it is unwilling to admit that
substantive due process is alive and well when individual liberties are in issue. See Karst,
supra note 11, at 664-66.
53. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUnONAL LAW 989 (1978).
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extension of a right of privacy with respect to matters of family is a right to
marry, logic requires that the individual's right to select a marriage
partner is also protected by the right of privacy.'
Because they make certain choices as to a marriage partner illegal,
incest statutes are a direct, substantial, and intentional intrusion into an
individual's decision to marry. In most instances, if the partners fall
within the statute's prohibited types of consanguineous or affineous
relationships, the marriage is invalid and the participants may be subject
to criminal penalties.5 Thus, incest statutes should be subjected to the
same rigorous scrutiny used by the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail.1 One
must critically and sensitively examine both the state's asserted i.nterests
in prohibiting certain marriages as incestuous as well as the relationship
between those state interests and the means the state uses to effectuate
them. Only a substantial, important state interest can justify such an
intrusion into the individual's choice of marriage partner, and only a
statute narrowly tailored to accomplish such a purpose is permissible.
To date, however, the courts' treatment of challenges to state incest
statutes, and most references to these statutes in court decisions, are
instructive only as examples of how a court should not examine the claim
that an incest statute impermissibly intrudes on the individual's right to
marry. 7 The remainder of this article examines the permissibility of state
incest statutes within the analytical framework drawn from the force and
rationale of the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the right of privacy
and choice. The various state interests purportedly served by an incest
statute are separately analyzed. Because of the balance which must be
54. In Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, the Court sub silentio recognized that, absent a very
important reason, the state is not permitted to infringe upon the choice of a marriage
partner. The marriage applicant could have selected another marriage partner who had the
financial resources to enable the applicant to meet his financial obligations to his out-of-
custody children. However, the Court treated the applicant as if he were barred completely
from marrying because his chosen marriage partner did not have sufficient financial re-
sources to permit the applicant to meet his support obligation.
55. Three states, Michigan, New Jersey and Ohio, have repealed their criminal incest
statutes, but have retained civil sanctions for participants in an incestuous marriage.
56. 434 U.S. at 386.
57. Individual Supreme Court justices have stated, without any discussion, that incest
statutes are permissible forms of state regulation of marriage. Id. at 399 (Powell, J.,
concurring); id. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring). In one state court decision, the state's
incest statute was judicially expanded to prohibit the marriage of adoptive siblings who had
never lived in the same household. In re MEW, 4 Pa. D. & C. 3d 51 (C.P. Allegheny 1977).
But see Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978). Judicial unwillingness to examine closely
challenges to state incest statutes may have a pragmatic explanation. The courts have just so
much political capital at any given time, and the judiciary is unwilling to expend it on the
invalidation of incest statutes. Therefore, the issue of incest statutes as impermissible
infringements of the right to marry may have tc' be raised again and again until the judiciary
is ready to address it. Accord Karst, supra note 11, at 691 n.304 (discussing unwillingness of
Supreme Court to review challenges to state sodomy laws).
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struck between the individual's interest in marrying the partner of her or
his choice and the asserted state interest at stake in forbidding that
choice, each state interest is analyzed as to both its legitimacy and its
importance. Each discussion, by necessity, draws heavily on material
from other disciplines such as genetics, psychology, psychiatry, sociol-
ogy, and philosophy. This methodology is required because the asserted
state interests themselves involve these various disciplines. Within the
discussion of each state purpose supposedly served by an incest statute,
the fit between the purpose and the statute as a means of achieving that
purpose is carefully scrutinized. Particular attention is given to whether a
less burdensome means is available to the state to accomplish the purpose
as well as to whether the statute is overbroad or underinclusive in light of
the asserted governmental purpose.
I. The Hereditary Biological
Function and Negative Eugenics
A commonly articulated state purpose for incest statutes is that they serve
a hereditary-biological function in which the state has a legitimate in-
terest. This function is based upon certain misconceptions of the heredi-
tary process and unexamined attitudes reflecting negative eugenics
theory" entertained by legislators, jurists, and the public. This section is
in two parts: the first is an overview of genetics and the second is a critique
of the philosophical underpinnings of the negative eugenics justification
for incest statutes.
A. Genetics
The primary misconception underlaying the asserted hereditary-bio-
logical function of incest statutes is the belief that consanguineous
matings59 cause genetically defective offspring. A cursory examination of
58. Eugenics, from the Greek, meaning "well-born," was coined by Sir Francis Galton,
the father of the modern-day eugenics movement. Comment, Eugenic Sterilization Statutes:
A Constitutional Re-Evaluation, 14 J. FAm. L. 280, 281 n.6 (1975). Eugenics ideas did not
originate with Galton, nor are incest statutes the only contemporary manifestations of
eugenics theories. The concept of selective breeding to improve the human race was
proposed in Plato's Republic. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch Is Almost Dead:
Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 995, 977 (1977).
State statutes authorizing involuntary sterilization of certain people are contemporary
examples of eugenics programs. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 252A.13 (West 1982).
59. Technically, a consanguineous mating is any mating between two individuals who
share at least one common ancestor. However, for the purposes of this article, a consan-
guineous mating is defined as a mating between two individuals who have at least one
common ancestor within the preceding four generations. See A.C. STVENSON, B.C.
DAVISON & M.W. OAKES, GENETIC COUNSELLING 107 (1970) [hereinafter cited as A.C.
STEVENSON].
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Mendelian," autosomal6l dominant and recessive inheritance 62 reveals
that such a belief is simply inaccurate.6 1
The nucleus of each cell in the human body, except for gametes (i.e.,
sperm and ova), contains twenty-two pairs of autosomal chromosomes
and two sex chromosomes for a normal complement of forty-six chromo-
somes. Each chromosome is composed of a linear succession of genes'
positioned along a backbone of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).6 The
number of genes present on a set of forty-six chromosomes is not known,
although estimates range from 10,000 to 100,000.6 A given gene (e.g.,
the gene that controls eye color), occupies a specific position on a particu-
lar chromosome. 7 Both members of the chromosome pair willcontain
that gene at that particular locus. Therefore, each gene can have two
possible representations"' on a chromosome pair--one on each chromo-
some member. If the gene is of the same form on both chromosomes on
the pair (e.g., both genes are for brown eyes), the individual is character-
ized as homozygous for that gene.69 If the genes at that particular place on
60. A Mendelian, or unilocal, disorder results from an anomaly attributable to a single
base pair substitution at one locus on one pair of chromosomes. In addition to this type of
heritable genetic disorder, there are multilocal and aneuploid disorders. Multilocal dis-
orders are under the control of several different loci of one or more pairs of chromosomes.
Any disorder attributable to a departure from the normal number of sets of genes is
classified as an aneuploid disorder. E. MURPHY & G. CHASE, PRINCIPLES OF GENETIC
COUNSELLING 21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as E. MURPHY].
61. There are two types of chromosomes-autosomal and sex chromosomes. Autosomal
chromosomes appear in twenty-two pairs in the nucleus of each somatic cell. The two
remaining chromosomes in the nucleus are called sex chromosomes. In a female the two sex
chromosomes are the same and are designated as X-chromosomes. In a male one of the sex
chromosomes is an X-chromosome and the other is a Y-chromosome. Epstein, Medical
Genetics: Recent Advances with Legal Implications, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 35 (1969-70).
.62. In autosomal dominant inheritance, a single gene in a gene pair of an autosomal
chromosome pair causes the trait associated with that gene to be manifested clinically.
Traits characterized by recessive autosomal inheritance are manifested only when both
genes in the relevant gene pair are mutants. Motulsky & Hecht, Genetic Prognosis and
Counselling, 90 AM. J. OBST. & GYNEC. 1227, 1227-30 (1964).
63. This article relies on the Mendelian autosomal inheritance construct because it is the
simplest type of inheritance. Moreover, if commonly held generalizations concerning the
hereditary-biological function of incest statutes are incorrect when measured against the
least complicated type of inheritance, they are also incorrect in the context of the more
complex inheritance mechanisms.
64. Developments in molecular genetics establish that it is not technically correct to
characterize a gene as the basic, indivisible unit of genetic inheritance. However, treating it
as such an entity does not effect the integrity of this article. See A.C. STEVENSON, supra note
59, at 24-25.
65. Id. at 337.
66. Lederberg, State Channeling of Gene Flow by Regulation of Marriage and Procreation
in GENETICS AND THE LAW 247 (A. Milunsky & G. Annus eds. 1976).
67. A.C. STEVENSON, supra note 59, at 26-27, 339.
68. The normal gene is referred to as "wild type" from the French "type sauvage." This is
the gene type which causes no detrimental effects. It probably represents a range of forms,
all of which have no detrimental effect, rather than one gene. Significant evidence exists that
harmful genes, variant or mutant genes, also exist in a range of forms which are all
detrimental. Id. at 27.
69. Id. at 338.
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the chromosomes of the pair are different (e.g., one is for brown eyes and
one is for blue eyes), then the individual is heterozygous for that trait. 70
Various traits are either dominant or recessive. A recessive gene trait is
only clinically manifested when the particular gene is in the same form on
both chromosomes of the pair. Blue eyes is a recessive trait; therefore an
individual can only have blue eyes if she or he has the gene for blue eyes
on both chromosomes of the pair. Dominant genetic traits, e.g., brown
eyes, are clinically manifested even though one of the two genes for that
trait is in that form. Consequently, a person who has one gene for blue
eyes and one gene for brown eyes will actually have brown eyes. 7
Each gamete, either sperm or ovum, contains twenty-three chromo-
somes-one half of the normal set. Gametes are formed by a process
called meiosis ' by which the twenty-three pairs of chromosomes in a
body cell are separated, with one chromosome of each pair going to a
separate gamete. The process of fertilization produces a zygote by joining
one gamete from each parent. Therefore, each chromosome pair con-
tained in the zygote has one chromosome member from each parent. The
zygote is the precursor of a new being whose genetic makeup is partially
determined by each parent. '
If a person carries two genes for brown eye color, when meiosis occurs
each gamete contains one gene for brown eye color. Similarly, if the
genes are both for blue eye color, each gamete contains one gene for blue
eye color. However, if the chromosome pair contains one gene for brown
eye color and one gene for blue eye color, upon meiosis, one gamete
contains the "brown" gene and the other gamete contains the "blue"
gene.7' Depending upon which gene is contributed by the mother's ga-
mete and which is contributed by the father's gamete during the fertiliza-
tion process, the illustration in Table 1 represents the possible genetic
compositions for eye color of the resulting zygote.
A dominant trait is clinically manifested whenever the dominant gene
is present. Therefore, any offspring in Table 1 with the genetic composi-
tion "brown-brown" or "brown-blue" has brown eyes.75 Since a recessive
70. Id. Because a female has two X-chromosomes, she will be homozygous or heterozy-
gous for a particular gene on the X-chromosomes. However, the terms are inapplicable to
genes appearing on the X-chromosome of a male. The other sex chromosome is a Y-
chromosome which is not identical to an X-chromosome in genetic structure. Therefore,
males are hemizygous for genes on the X-chromosome. E. MURPHY, supra note 60, at 33.
71. A. C. STEVENSON, supra note 59, at 28. In their strict meaning, "dominant" and
"recessive" apply to traits that are determined by genes and not to the genes themselves.
However, it is a common practice, which will be employed in this article for the sake of
brevity, to refer to genes as recessive and dominant. See id. at 29.
72. E. MURPHY, supra note 60, at 33.
73. A. C. STEVENSON, supra note 59, at 9-15.
74. See id. at 25.
75. In this article, the discussion is limited to gene traits which, as predicted by the
Mendelian inheritance construct, are invariably manifested. Geneticists, however, have
identified the phenomena of nonpenetrance and incomplete display of Mendelian traits. E.
MURPHY, supra note 60, at 270-89.
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trait is manifested only when both genes associated with that trait are
present in the same form, only the offspring in Table 1 with the genetic
composition "blue-blue" have blue eyes. There is a difference in the
genetic makeup of "brown-brown" and "brown-blue" offspring, but the
difference is only important when the offspring reproduce. The "brown-
brown" offspring must pass a "brown" gene to all of its gametes, whereas
the "brown-blue" offspring passes a "brown" gene to half of its gametes
and a "blue" gene to the other half.
The offspring of two homozygous parents ("brown-brown") for the
"brown" gene must all be homozygous for the "brown" gene. (Table 1,
Figure 1.) Similarly, the offspring of two homozygous parents ("blue-
blue") for the "blue" gene must all be homozygous for the "blue" gene.
(Table 1, Figure 6.) If both parents are heterozygous ("brown-blue") for
the trait, one in four of the offspring will be homozygous ("brown-
brown") for the "brown" gene; one in four will be homozygous ("blue-
blue") for the "blue" gene; and two in four will be heterozygous
("brown-blue"). (Table 1, Figure 4.) Three of the four offspring
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("brown-brown" and "brown-blue") will have brown eyes, because
"brown" is a dominant gene trait. Only one in four of the offspring
("blue-blue") will have blue eyes because it is a recessive gene trait.
This Mendelian construct of gene expression applies to literally
thousands of gene pairs within a somatic cell. Although expectant parents
may be interested in the probability of their child having blue or brown
eyes, whether the dominant brown or the recessive blue trait is ultimately
expressed is of no significance to the offspring's well-being. The probabil-
ity of gene expression is crucial, however, if the dominant or recessive
trait has a deleterious effect when expressed in the offspring.
Genetic research has identified many genetically linked disorders and
has determined the probability of their occurrence. '6 Research has also
established that recessive autosomal traits are more severe in their man-
ifestation than are dominant autosomal traits.' On the average each
human carries between one and five deleterious recessive genes.'8
However, these deleterious genes usually do not result in offspring who
exhibit the trait associated with the gene because there is only a very small
likelihood of mating with a person who carries the same recessive gene at
the same locus on the same chromosome in the same pair.' The danger in
consanguineous matings is not, as commonly believed, that such unions
cause or increase the number of deleterious recessive genes in the
offspring. Rather, such matings increase the probability that the spouses
both carry an identical recessive gene which will be passed to the
offspring in the double dose necessary for the expression of the trait
associated with that recessive gene.'
For example, if a particular individual is heterozygous for a recessive
gene trait, there is a 0.5 probability that the individual's parent, child or
sibling is also heterozygous for the trait.8 ' If the heterozygous individual
76. Identified autosomal disorders include Huntington's chorea, Von Recklinghausen's
disease, facio-scapulo-humeral muscular dystrophy and Marfan's syndrome. A.C.
STEVENSON, supra note 59, at 147, 149, 203, 211. Autosomal recessive disorders include
Cyclops, limb girdle muscular dystrophy, fibrocystic disease, and Hurler's syndrome. Id. at
168, 201, 220, 259.
77. The severity of sex-linked genetic traits falls between the severity of recessive and
dominant autosomal traits. An X-linked trait acts like a dominant trait in males because
males do not have another X-chromosome to disguise the gene. However, in females an
X-linked trait behaves as a recessive trait because females do have another X-chromosome
which can contain a normal dominant gene. McKusick, The Nosology of Genetic Disease, in
MEDICAL GENETICS 214 (V. McKusick & R. Clairborne eds. 1973).
78. An average of five deleterious recessive genes means that less than 1 percent of the
population is free of all deleterious recessive genes. Lederberg, supra note 66, at 258.
Presently, there is no satisfactory method for determining the average number of delete-
rious recessive genes carried by each person. E. MURPHY, supra note 60, at 232.
79. Although there are hundreds of different recessive gene traits, probably not more
than 1/1000 children born will be effected by a harmful recessive gene trait. A.C.
STEVEN sON, suipra note 59, at 117.
80. E. MURPHY, supra note 60, at 215.
81. The proportion of genes two blood relatives have in common is expressed by the
coefficient of relatedness. The coefficient of relatedness between lineals (parent, child,
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has offspring by her or his parent, child, or sibling, the probability that
the offspring will be homozygous for the recessive gene trait is 0.125.82
Assuming the mean number of harmful recessive gene traits carried per
person is one and there is no history of deleterious gene traits in the
pedigree, the risk of homozygosity, i.e., expression of the recessive gene
trait, in the offspring of selected consanguineous matings is summarized
in Table 2.11
The probabilities of offspring who are homozygous for a deleterious
recessive gene appear low, but they are higher than the 0.001 probability
of homozygosity for a deleterious recessive gene in nonconsanguineous
matings when there is no family history of such recessive gene, traits.'
Some empirical data suggest that consanguineous matings lead to an
increase in infant mortality, congenital birth defects and anthropometric
changes.'
Neither the theoretical increased probability of homozygosity in
offspring of consanguineous matings nor the empirical evidence of a
decrease in fitness of such offspring is sufficient to justify an incest statute.
The available empirical information often comes from a sample which is
too small to yield statistically meaningful results.' Moreover, the results
of studies on inbred populations (e.g., the Amish) are limited to popula-
grandparent, grandchild) is [1/ 2]K. K is the degree of relationship between the two lineals,
which is obtained by counting the generations in the direct link between them. The degree of
relationship between a parent and child is 10. Therefore, the coefficient of relatedness is
[1/211 or 0.500.
The coefficient of relatedness for collateral relatives is found by using the formula 2 11/2]K
because there are two common ancestors. The civil law method of counting the degree of
relationship is used. For example, siblings stand in 2* of relationship. Therefore, the
coefficient of relatedness is 2[1/212 or one half or 0.500. Farrow & Juberg, Genetics and Laws
Prohibiting Marriage in the United States, 209 J.A.M.A. 534, 535-36 (1969).
82. This probability is arrived at by first determining the coefficient of inbreeding (F).
F = '/2 (coefficient of relatedness). Thus, in the example of a person having offspring
with that individual's parent, child, or sibling, the coefficient of relatedness is ('/2)(/2)
Fn
= 'A. The expected frequency of recessive gene traits in offspring is Fn where n
is the mean number of harmful recessive genes carried per person. If n = 1, then the
expected frequency of recessive gene traits in the offspring is ( )(/4)(1), or ('/8) or 0.125. If
n = 2, the expected frequency is (1/2)(4)(2), or ( /), or 0.250. Id. at 536; A.C. STEVENSON,
supra note 59, at 118; E. MURPHY, supra note 60, at 230-31.
83. If there is a known recessive gene trait in the pedigree, the determination of the risk to
the offspring of manifesting the trait is determined by the same methodology employed
when unrelated mates have a known recessive trait. See infra Table 3.
84. A.C. STEVENSON, supra note 59, at 118.
85. Congenital means that a particular disease or abnormality is present at birth. Such a
condition may be caused by environmental factors (e.g., injury during the birthing process
or maternal rubella infection during pregnancy), genetic factors, or an interaction of genetic
and environmental factors. Fraser, Genetic Counselling in MEDICAL GENEICS 221 (V.
McKusick & R. Clairborne eds. 1973). Anthropometric changes refers to weight, height,
and head circumference. See W.J. SCHULL & J.V. NEEL, THE EFFECTs OF INBREEDING ON
JAPANESE CHILDREN (1965); Fried & Davies, Some Effects on the Offspring of Uncle-Niece
Marriage in the Moroccan Jewish Community in Jerusalem, 26 AM. J. HuM. GENET. 65
(1975).
86. The Fried-Davies study of uncle-niece marriages is based on twenty-seven such
marriages. Id.
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TABLE 2
10 Lineals (parent, child) 0.1250
2' Collaterals (siblings)
2* Lineals (grandparent, grandchild)
3* Collaterals (niece/nephew, aunt, uncles) 0.0625
One-half-siblings, double first cousins
3* Lineals (greatgrandparent, greatgrandchild)
4* Collaterals (grandniece/nephew, grandaunt/uncle, 0.03125
first cousins)
One-half-niece/nephew, one-half aunt/uncle
4* Lineals (greatgreatgrandparent,
greatgreatgrandchild)
5* Collaterals (greatgrandniece/nephew, greatgrand-
aunt/uncle, first cousins once removed) 0.015625
One-half-grandniece/nephew, one-half grand
aunt/uncle, one-half-first cousins
50 Lineals (greatgreatgreatgrand-
parent, greatgreatgreatgrandchild)
60 Collaterals (greatgrandniece/nephew,
greatgrandaunt/uncle, first 0.0078125
cousins once removed, second cousins)
One-half-greatgrandniece/nephew, one-half-great-
grandaunt/uncle, one-half-first cousins
tions with a comparable degree of inbreeding for the same amount of
time' and are therefore not very useful in predicting the risk of disorders
in consanguineous matings in other communities or between particular
individuals. Even the results of large-scale studies are subject to different
scientific interpretationu and should not be the basis for an incest prohibi-
tion.
Similarly, the increased expectation that a recessive gene trait will
occur in the offspring of incestuous unions is not proof of the adequacy or
permissibility of a genetic justification for incest statutes. The same
87. "[A]n inbreeding coefficient of 0.05 in ... a town in Wyoming recently settled from
many sources would not have the same impact as in an Indian village where the same degree
of inbreeding had been practiced for 3,000 years; and this statement would be true even if
the environments were identical." E. MURPHY, supra note 60, at 232.
88. "So far as we can judge from these data the effects are small and should provide
considerable grounds for reassurance in marriages no closer than first cousins [4*]. The
preliminary data on closer relationships suggest somewhat more substantial effects but
nothing like the horrendous kinds of increases that are commonly imagined." Id. at 235. See
also G. MURDOCK, SOCIAL STRUCTURE 240 (1949). Contra A. C. STEVENSON, supra note 59, at
117-18.
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construct or model is applicable for any recessive gene trait, whether it is
a "good" or "bad" trait. If a person possesses a "good" recessive gene
trait, then, consanguineous matings increase the probability of the man-
ifestation of that trait in the offspring, and incest statutes impede their
manifestations. More importantly, forbidding consanguineous matings
to prevent the manifestation of deleterious recessive gene traits is, at
best, incremental in effect and may impede the achievement of that
objective. For example, it would take the sterilization of 200 generations
of all albinos (those who are homozygous for the recessive trait causing
albinoism) to reduce the proportion of albinos in the population to half
the present frequency. 9 As incest statutes forbid only matings within the
prescribed classes, the elimination of any recessive trait carried in the
heterozygous state would take even longer.
Incest statutes may actually increase the likelihood of deleterious
recessive gene traits appearing in future generations. The gene trait, if
severe enough, will eliminate itself from the gene pool when it is man-
ifested in the homozygote by killing the homozygote or rendering her or
him sterile. If incest statutes prevent the coming together of two recessive
genes in the present generation, the gene will be dispersed throughout
the population in general. This increases the frequency for that trait in the
population as a whole in succeeding generations and, in turn, increases
the probability that two unrelated persons carrying the same recessive
gene in the heterozygous state will mate and produce homozygous, or
affected, offspring.'
Geneticists can presently compute the probability of offspring man-
ifesting a deleterious genetic trait outside the context of consanguineous
matings. If the parental genotypes9' are known, risk estimates can be
made with respect to both autosomal dominant and recessive gene traits.
Within the context of brown and blue eye colors, Table 3 summarizes the
proportion of offspring affected and unaffected by the dominant and
recessive gene traits.
The majority of matings involving dominant deleterious genes are
those represented in Table 3, Figure 5.' The risk that an offspring of such
a mating will be affected by the dominant gene trait is 0.50. The most
common mating involving recessive deleterious gene traits is analogous
to Table 3, Figure 4." The risk that the offspring of such a mating will be
affected by the deleterious recessive gene is 0.25. The risk in both of these
instances is higher than the expectation (0.125) that the offspring of the
closest consanguineous mating (parent, child, sibling) will be an affected
89. Golding, EthicalIssues in Biological Engineering, 15 UCLA L. REV. 443. 473 (1968).
90. Lederberg, supra note 66, at 252.
91. Genotype is the genetic makeup of a person whereas phenotype is the appearance a
person presents on examination. E. MURPHY, supra note 60, at 34.
92. A.C. STEVENSON, supra note 59. at 62.
93. Id. at 102.
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TABLE 3
BROWN BROWN BLUE
EYES EYES EYES
PARENT PARENT HOMO- HETERO- HoMo-
#1 #2 ZYGOTE ZYGOTE ZYGOTE
[Brown- [Brown- [Blue-
Brown] Blue] Blue]
Brown- Brown-
Brown Brown 1.00
[Homo- [Homo-
zygote] zygote]
Brown- Brown-
Brown Blue 0.50 0.50
[Homo- [Hetero-
zygote] zygote]
Brown- Blue-
Brown Blue 1.00
[Homo- [Homo-
zygote] zygote]
Brown- Brown-
Blue Blue 0.25 0.50 0.25
[Hetero- [Hetero-
zygote] zygote]
Brown- Blue-
Blue Blue 0.50 0.50
[Hetero- [Homo-
zygote] zygote]
Blue- Blue-
Blue Blue 0 1.00
[Homo- [Homo-
zygote] zygote]
homozygote for a deleterious recessive gene trait. There are, however,
no legal impediments to a marriage between individuals who are known
to be affected by a deleterious dominant or recessive gene trait or for
those individuals who are known carriers of deleterious recessive gene
traits.
Genetic prediction has progressed to the point that it can even estimate
genetic risks when the parents' genotypes are not known but there has
been a lineal or collateral relative or an offspring of the parents who
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manifested a deleterious gene trait. 9' Some state statutes require mar-
riage license applicants to undergo genetic screening for certain traits.95
They do not, however, forbid the marriage of those found to be affected
by the trait or those who are unaffected carriers of the trait. No state
forbids any marriages, except consanguineous marriages, on the basis of
the genetic probability of producing affected offspring.
Clearly, then, the scientific genetic justification for incest statutes does
not withstand analysis. The genetic dangers of consanguineous matings
are not only fairly minimal but are exceeded by the genetic dangers
involved in the matings of other social populations. As these more
dangerous matings are not prohibited on genetic grounds, neither should
incestuous marriages. The next section examines the sociological compo-
nent of the genetic argument for incest statutes, eugenics.
B. Eugenics
Eugenics purports to be the study of agencies under social control that
impair or improve the physical and mental qualities of the race. En-
couraging the procreation of biologically and socially desirable popula-
tions (positive eugenics) and discouraging the procreation of inferior
populations (negative eugenics) are the goals of this social movement.'
The favored mechanism for attaining these eugenics goals is the use of the
coercive power of the state.9' Statutory limitations on reproduction by
and between certain people through restrictions on the right to marry are
one example of the exercise of the state's coercive powers in furtherance
of eugenics goals.98 Another example is the total elimination of reproduc-
tive capacity through involuntary sterilization statutes."
In the context of incest statutes, the legislative enactments partially
restrain an individual's ability to procreate by limiting the pool of poten-
tial mates. To the extent this limitation of procreational choice is
94. E. MURPHY, supra note 60, at 106-70.
95. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.05.101-.181 (1977) (premarital screening for heritable
disease); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-797.40 to .44 (1974 & Supp. 1975-1983) (state may
provide premarital screening); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 204-05 (Smith-Hurd 1984-85
Cum. Supp.) (premarital testing may be given when deemed appropriate by a physician);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-1-7 (Burns 1980) (premarital screening test in conjunction with
premarital exam); Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.310-340 (Cum. Supp. 1982) (premarital screening
in conjunction with premarital exam).
96. Comment, supra note 58.
97. At least one commentator has suggested that the state's interest in diminishing the
cost and suffering caused by genetic diseases through negative eugenics programs is more
compelling than the state's interest in propagating superior qualities in the population.
Vukowich, The Dawning of the Brave New World-Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of
Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 222.
98. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-07 (1981): "Marriage by a woman under the age of
forty-five years or by a man any age, unless he marries a woman over the age of forty-five
years, is prohibited if such a man or woman is institutionalized as severely retarded."
99. Fourteen states have statutes permitting sterilization for the mentally ill or mentally
retarded. See Damme, Controlling Genetic Disease Through Law, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 801,
830 n. 140 (1982) and statutes cited therein.
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grounded in concerns for the genetic quality of the offspring of certain
marriages, incest statutes are an exercise in negative eugenics legislation
and must be examined as such.
The exercise of state power initially appears permissible because
theories of natural selection and genetic inheritance, as understood by
the public, seem to confirm the objective, scientific nature of the goal of
eliminating genetically defective or undesirable offspring."I Upon closer
scrutiny, however, this patina of legitimacy disappears. Using the state's
power to guard the integrity of the gene pool for future generations is a
philosophical choice which is not dictated by contemporary scientific
understandings of genetic inheritance in humans. Moreover, science does
not purport to supply a social definition of which persons are socially or
biologically desirable or those who are defective or inferior. Finally, even
if one accepts the legitimacy of the philosophical principles upon which
eugenics is based, one must doubt the efficacy of incest statutes as the
chosen method of state intervention.
Initially, there is a question whether it is a proper governmental
function to protect the gene pool of the future at the expense of the
procreational rights of its presently existing citizens.' Any type of state-
sponsored negative eugenics program requires the community of the
present to bear that burden, while the benefit, if any, is reaped in the
future. Eugenics laws generally raise a question of our moral relationship
to those who may come into being in the future. The significant amount of
disagreement among contemporary writers shows that this relationship is
not at all clear, and certainly it is less clear than our understanding of our
moral obligations to the present community." Moreover, the contem-
porary concepts of individual rights, as reflected in increasing judicial
sensitivity to procreational choice, are at odds with eugenics concerns of
strengthening the physical and mental qualities of the race.10 3
Acceptance of the proposition that incest statutes are a legitimate
legislative infringement on individual procreational choice because of
concerns about the genetic makeup of the offspring of such unions
100. See A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA; A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND
TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES (2d ed. 1949); L. CAVILLI-STORZA & W. BODMER, THE
GENETICS OF HUMAN POPULATION (1971). For examples on views on the laws of heredity in
the early twentieth century, see C. DAVENPORT, HEREDITY IN RELATION TO EUGENICS (1911);
W. CASTLE, GENETICS AND EUGENICS (1921).
101. See Golding, supra note 89. In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), the Court
dismissed any consideration of this fundamental question by stating that "three generations
of imbeciles are enough." However, at least one state court recognized very early that
negative eugenics legislation raises the question of "whether it is one of the attributes of
government to essay the theoretical improvement of society by destroying the function of
procreation in certain of its members who are not malefactors against its laws. Smith
v. Board of Examiners, 88 A. 963, 965 (N.J. 1913).
102. See Golding, supra note 89; O'Hara and Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L. J.
20 (1956); Vukowich, supra note 97.
103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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logically creates a wide and difficult-to-limit area of legislative activity.
Incest statutes impair procreational choice based on at most a 0.125 risk
of defective offspring. If this is the accepted degree of intrusion, argu-
ably, the state has the power to forbid procreation in all those matings
which have an equal or higher risk of producing genetically affected
offspring." It is presently possible to ascertain the probability of produc-
ing offspring with deleterious genetic traits from matings other than
incestuous ones."I As genetic knowledge increases, the ability to detect
carriers of deleterious genes as well as the ability to estimate the probabil-
ity of adversely affected offspring will increase." A logical corollary of
using the state as the guardian of the gene pool is that the state would
have the power to require compulsory genetic screening"° of all would-be
matings, and to prohibit those matings which carry at least a 0.125 risk or
higher risk of producing offspring with deleterious genetic traits. As each
person has between one and five deleterious recessive genetic traits, this
kind of intrusion would be felt by everyone.
Before the power of the state could be used in this way to control
individual mating decisions, definitions of "genetically defective" and
"socially undesirable" offspring must be formulated. Past negative eu-
genics legislation shows that there is nothing "scientific" or "objective" in
the definitions of these terms as used by various legislative bodies. At one
time or another, involuntary sterilization statutes applied to such classes
as confirmed criminals, epileptics, moral degenerates, two-time sex crim-
inals with moral depravity, three-time sex criminals with moral depravity,
syphilitics, drug fiends, prostitutes, twice-convicted felons, and many
other classes defined by characteristics which are not genetically
transmissible. 10 Indeed, the concepts of "genetically defective" and
"socially undesirable" when used in the context of negative eugenics
legislation are value-laden terms without any objective content. Propo-
nents of eugenics legislation historically have been more concerned with
the outward physical appearance of the offspring (phenotypes) than with
the offspring's genetic makeup (genotype).'" Those whose deleterious
recessive trait is masked in the heterzygote create no demands for the
legislature to prevent their procreation. Only the obviously physically
104. Lederberg, supra note 66, at 252.
105. E. MURPHY, supra note 60, at 106-70.
106. The progress of genetic nosology is demonstrated by the steady increase in the
number of identified genetic traits. Between 1958 and 1973, the number increased from
something over 400 to more than 1,000. McKusick, supra note 77, at 217.
107. Genetic screening is the process of surveying target populations for genetic disease or
for the presence of abnormal genes in the carrier (heterozygous) state. Over eighty tests are
now available for prenatal screening by amniocentesis. Shaw, Legal Issues in Medical
Genetics in PSYCHIATRY AND GENETICS-PsYCHOSOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDER-
ATIONS 188 (M. Sperber & L. Jarvik eds. 1976).
108. Comment, supra note 58, at 285 n.20.
109. Golding, supra note 89, at 466 n.5.
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impaired offspring cause concern. Also, the choice of an ideal phenotype
depends heavily on ideological perspectives."'
Putting aside the ideological considerations involved in selecting a
definition of "defective" and "undesirable" offspring, an acceptable
objective definition is still extremely difficult if not impossible to formu-
late. For example, are offspring "genetically defective" if medical knowl-
edge exists which can eliminate or compensate for the deleterious trait?
Phenylketonuria (PKU),"' left untreated in infants, causes irreversible
brain damage. However, the timely application of a low phenylalanine
diet ameliorates this "defect." The same is true for errors of refraction in
the eye;"' corrective lenses can compensate for many such monofactorial
inheritance disorders. Genetically caused abnormalities in phenotype
such as a harelip or a cleft palate can be corrected surgically. Are
individuals displaying such correctable defects truly "defective"? In addi-
tion, some genetic traits are "bad" in one environment and "good" in
another, as is the case of genes that determine susceptibility to sickle-cell
anemia."
It has been suggested that, since the conditions of life in the future are
not known, there is something to be said for "genetic waste." It may be
important to preserve genetic diversity even though it means that various
"defectives" will transmit their genes into the future."' Any attempt to
use the power of the state to control genetic channeling by regulating
marriage eliminates "good" genetic traits with the "bad."" 5
Another possible argument that the state has a legitimate interest in
preventing the procreation of genetically defective offspring is the idea
that the state has a legitimate interest in insuring that the responsibilities
110. Id. at 465.
111. PKU is an autosomal recessive trait. The disease results from a deficiency of liver
phenylalanine hydroxylase. This results in an excess of phenylalanine in the blood and
spinal fluid. Once a baby with PKU is delivered and exposed to protein, central nervous
system damage occurs. A ferric chloride urine screening test done at about the age of one
month may detect the presence of PKU. However, a blood test using a drop of blood from
the infant's heel is a more reliable test for PKU. The test can be done immediately after
delivery. Hsia & Holtzman, A Critical Evaluation of PKU Screening in MEDICAL GENETICS
237-38 (V. McKusick and R. Clairborne eds., 1973).
112. A.C. STEVENSON, supra note 59, at 172-73.
113. Golding, supra note 89, at 473. Sickle-cell anemia is a genetically induced disease of
the hemoglobin. The trait is prevalent in the moist areas of west and central Africa.
Heterozygous sickle trait is a positive advantage in these regions because it partially protects
the heterozygote against the malignant falciparum form of malaria. Sickle-cell trait does not
reduce the incidence or severity of malaria in adults, but it appears to give some protection
to infants. The trait improves an infant's chance of surviving the first malaria attack and
developing antibodies which partially protect the infant against further infections of the
disease. This protective effect of the sickle-cell trait explains the persistence of this other-
wise disadvantageous mutation that in malaria-free regions would have been eliminated
quite rapidly by natural selection. Conley & Charache, Inherited Hemoglobinopathics in
MEDICAL GENETICS 57-59 (V. McKusick and R. Clairborne eds. 1973).
114. Golding, supra note 89, at 476.
115. Id. at 475.
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of parenthood can be fulfilled by the potential parents. 6 The argument is
that genetically defective individuals cannot be adequate parents to their
own offspring, that procreation by such people produces offspring who
will be social and economic burdens on society because they will not be
cared for properly. However, many recessive as well as dominant gene
traits are lethal." That is, the trait either prevents the affected individual
from reproducing or it causes the death of the affected person. Obvi-
ously, such "genetically defective" people pose no risk of becoming
inadequate parents. Moreover, once it is logically and morally permissi-
ble to single out a group as theoretically inadequate parents and to forbid
their procreation, other high-risk groups, such as alcoholics or drug
addicts, may become subject to the same strictures."8 The state already
has a direct mechanism expressly to protect children who are the victims
of unfit parents. Neglect and abuse statutes protect children without
impinging on the procreational choice of only theoretically defective
parents.
Even if the state did have a legitimate interest in preventing an increase
in the number of mutations in the future by presently restricting the
transmission of harmful genes, incest statutes do not achieve that goal
and are, in reality, dysgenic in effect."9 Forbidding consanguineous mat-
ings in the present generation does reduce the probability that a delete-
rious recessive gene trait will be expressed in its homozygous form.
However, the recessive gene is not thereby eliminated from the gene
pool. It simply will not be expressed in a union between the heterozygote
carrier and the noncarrier mate. This dispersion of the gene in the
population as a whole will itself give rise to an increase in the gene
frequency in future generations.
Even if a eugenics perspective is acceptable on some basis, the method
chosen to achieve that goal is inadequate. Incest statutes are both under-
and over-inclusive. State incest statutes do not include all consan-
guineous matings with equivalent genetic risks. Double first cousin mat-
ings carry a 0.0625 risk, as do matings between second degree lineals
(grandparent-grandchild) and third degree collateral relatives (aunt-
nephew, uncle-niece). Only a minority of the states forbids any cousin
marriages, but all states forbid marriages between second-degree lineals
and third-degree collaterals.'" On the other hand, incest statutes pro-
116. Note, The Right of the Mentally Disabled to Marry: A Statutory Evaluation, 15 J.
FAM. L. 463, 478 (1976-77).
117. Any condition which produces complete sterility regardless of how long the person
with it survives is a genetic lethal. The same is true for genotypes such as Tay-Sachs disease,
which leads to death at an early age before the individual can reproduce. MURPHY, supra
note 60, at 55.
118. Note, supra note 116, at 478 n.20.
119. Lederberg, supra note 66, at 252.
120. Rhode Island permits uncle-niece marriages for members of the Jewish faith. R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 11-6-4, 15-1-4 (1981).
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hibiting certain affineous matings (mother-in-law and son-in-law, or
father-in-law and daughter-in-law) are overbroad, as such matings have
no genetic implications at all. Finally, the overbreadth of incest statutes
shows most clearly when the statutes are cast as a marriage prohibition
because all that is needed to further eugenics concerns is a prohibition on
reproduction between certain classes of individuals within and without
marriage.',
Current knowledge of genetic inheritance does not justify the persis-
tence of incest statutes in contemporary society. Present scientific knowl-
edge does show that the process of genetic inheritance is much more
complicated than the simplistic, nonscientific model on which incest
statutes are predicated. Since there is much dispute as to the conclusions
which may be drawn from presently accepted scientific data, courts
should be cautious in accepting legislation on the basis of supposed data
or under the guise that "scientists agree.'""
Any legitimate social interest in the production of offspring who are
emotionally, physically, socially, and economically healthy is better
served through other exercises of state power than through incest stat-
utes. For example, noncompulsory genetic screening programs alerting
potential marriage partners of associated genetic risks to their offspring
would reach more of the at-risk couples than do incest statutes. Programs
aimed at regulating known environmental factors (mutagens) which
cause congenital birth defects would protect more offspring than do
incest statutes.'23 Nutritional programs for pregnant women and infant
children as well as pre- and postnatal medical care would have a far
greater positive impact on the physical and mental health of offspring
than do incest statutes. Similarly, state intervention on behalf of abused
or neglected children has a greater likelihood of preventing inadequate
parenting than do incest statutes. Consequently, the rationale for incest
statutes today must rest on other than genetic and eugenic concerns for
their legitimacy.
The incest taboo is closely related to religious beliefs and societal
concepts of public morality. The next section examines the religious roots
of contemporary incest statutes as well as incest statutes as embodiments
of notions of public morality.
HI. Religion and the Public Morality Function
Although religious tenets condemning incest and definitions of public
morality characterizing incest as immoral are not coterminous, they are
sufficiently related to warrant being discussed together." For many
121. Vukowich, supra note 97, at 216.
122. Cook, Eugenics or Euthenics, 37 ILL. L. REV. 287, 289, 297 (1943).
123. Lederberg, supra note 66, at 262.
124. The condemnation of incest as an immoral act presupposes the existence of a more
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people, religion shapes their understanding of what constitutes incest and
their willingness to forbid such behavior by statute. Concepts of public
morality, apart from particular religious beliefs, are also asserted as
justifications for the use of state laws to enforce the incest taboo.
A. Religion
American incest laws have been shaped particularly by the religious
beliefs of Judaism and Christianity. If state incest statutes are merely
examples of secular enforcement of particular religious tenets, then the
statutes violate the constitutional prohibition against the establishment of
religion since preservation of divine law is not a permissible basis for state
legislation. Religious influence on American civil and criminal incest
statutes appears in the definitions of incestuous relationships. The pro-
scriptions in the statutes derive largely from the religious history of incest
in Europe generally and in England specifically.
In Europe, marriage was originally only an ecclesiastical concern;,"
indeed, incest did not become a secular offense in England until 1908.126
The canon law of the Church of Rome defined the relationships within
which marriage was forbidden. Initially, the admonishments found in the
book of Leviticus formed the basis of the canon law prohibitions. Leviti-
cal laws forbidding sexual contact with the clan included consanguineous
relationships (son and mother; father and daughter; father and grand-
daughter; brother and sister of the full or half blood; and nephew and
aunt) and certain relationships by affinity (son and stepmother; father-in-
law and daughter-in-law; nephew and aunt by marriage; and brother-in-
law and sister-in-law).'27 These canon law prohibitions did not remain
static. The Church of Rome expanded the forbidden list of relationships
until the marriage ban extended to persons related by consanguinity in
any degree.'" Moreover, because marriage was conceptualized as the
union of the husband and wife resulting in a metaphysical oneness, the
generalized moral theory. Otherwise, the condemnation is nothing more than a position
based on prejudice, rationalization, matters of personal aversion or taste, arbitrary stands,
or the like. Although a moral theory may rest on the teachings of a particular religious
belief, it is not a requirement that it does. Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of
Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 994-1002 (1965-66).
125. Hughes, The Crime of Incest, 55 J. CRIM. L. CORREC. & POLICE SCi. 322, 323 (1964);
Moore, A Defense of First-Cousin Marriage, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 136, 137 (1961).
126. Punishment of Incest Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, ch. 45. The statute criminalized sexual
intercourse by a man who knew the female was his granddaughter, daughter, sister, or
mother. It contained a similar prohibition for females sixteen-years-old or older. M.
GLENDON, supra note 2, at 43. There was a brief time during the Interregnum in England
when incest was a capital felony. However, upon the Restoration the law expired. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 230.2 (1980).
127. Leviticus 18:6-18. These laws for sexual conduct also forbade union or marriage with
the daughter or granddaughter of a woman with whom a man had had sexual relations as
well as simultaneous marriage with two sisters. THE JEROME BIBLICAL COMMENTARY 78-79
(R. Brown, J. Fitzmyer & R. Murphy eds. 1968).
128. This occured in A.D. 505 by the Council of Agde. Storke, The Incestuous Marriage-
Relic of the Past, 36 U. COLO. L. REV. 473, 474 (1963-64).
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blood relatives of each party to the union were treated as if they were the
blood relatives of the other." In its broadest form, the incest prohibition
encompassed all persons related by consanguinity and affinity in any
degree.l'-
This incest prohibition proved to be unworkable,13 1 and it was replaced
by a canon law forbidding marriages between those related by consan-
guinity and affinity in the fourth canonical degree.'3 2 During the reign of
Henry VIII, marriage became secularized and a statute was enacted in an
attempt to restrict the incest prohibitions. 33 The statute empowered the
secular courts to interfere with the ecclesiastical courts whenever the
latter attempted to invalidate a marriage contracted outside the Levitical
degrees that was not forbidden by "God's law." ' "God's laws" were
those degrees of relationship which were in accord with contempora-
neous opinions of the Church of England and which were expressed in the
Church of England's Table of Kindred and Affinity, promulgated in 1563.
The prohibitions were more extensive than those contained in Leviticus,
but less broad than the previous canon law of the Church of Rome.
Generally, all marriages between those related by consanguinity or affini-
ty in the third civil degree or closer were forbidden.13 The Church of
England's definition of prohibited marriages served as the basis for
American incest statutes. 13
129. M. PLOSCOWE, H. FOSTER & D. FREED, FAMILY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 198
(1972) [hereinafter cited as M. PLOSCOWE].
130. Matters were worse than they appear. Canonists determined that affinity existed
between any woman and man who had lawful or unlawful sexual intercourse. Storke, supra
note 128, at 474.
131. Europe was ruled by families who intermarried for political reasons. The Church of
Rome largely ignored the canonical defects in these marriages unless they were drawn to the
Church's attention. Usually, annulments and attempted annulments were politically moti-
vated. Eleanor of Aquitaine had her marriage to a distant cousin, Louis VII of France,
annulled. However, she was unsuccessful in obtaining an annulment of her marriage to
Henry II of England, who was a more closely related cousin. Henry VIII of England married
his brother's widow, Catherine of Aragon, because he received special dispensation from
Pope Julius II. Henry was unsuccessful in obtaining an annulment of the marriage in order
to marry Ann Boleyn even though there was no authority for the original papal dispensa-
tion. M. PLOSCOWE, supra note 129, at 199-200.
132. The Lateran Council of 1215 established this prohibition. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 230.2 (1980).
133. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 38 (1540). Martin Luther supported this limitation, but it was opposed
by John Calvin. Calvin wanted to extend the affinity bar to include sister or brother of a
deceased spouse. M. PLOSCOWE, supra note 129, at 207.
134. J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 274 (1881).
135. A man could not marry his grandmother, grandfather's wife, wife's grandmother,
father's sister, mother's sister, father's brother's wife, mother's brother's wife, wife's
father's sister, wife's mother's sister, mother, stepmother, wife's mother, daughter, wife's
daughter, son's wife, sister, wife's sister, brother's wife, son's daughter, daughter's daugh-
ter, son's son's wife, daughter's son's wife, wife's son's daughter, wife's daughter's daugh-
ter, brother's daughter. sister's daughter, brother's son's wife, sister's son's wife, wife's
brother's daughter and wife's sister's daughter. Analogous prohibitions applied to a
woman. Id. at 275 n.l.
136. In his commentary on the laws of marriage in the United States, Joel Bishop asserted
that this statute was received as part of the common law of this country. Id. at 98 n.4.
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The history of incest laws in the United States is one of gradual, but
uneven, contraction of the types of forbidden relationships. By the latter
part of the nineteenth century, civil prohibitions continued to parallel the
English canon law categories with the exception that most states did not
restrict marriages between a husband and his wife's sister, 37 but did have
civil prohibitions against first cousin marriages.' Every state had crimi-
nal sanctions to enforce the civil limitations on marriage. 39 By the mid-
1950s, only eighteen states prohibited first cousin marriages, and at least
half the states had eliminated the affinity bar from their criminal incest
statutes.'" As only consanguineous bars remained in those states' crimi-
nal incest statutes, they did not cover adoptive, step- and in-law rela-
tionships. A survey of state criminal incest statutes in 1983 revealed that
three states had repealed all criminal sanctions against incestuous mat-
ings and marriages.'4 ' Only eight states continued to have criminal sanc-
tions for first cousin marriages' 2 and only Georgia continued to have
criminal sanctions against affinity relationships similar to those affinity
relationships established by English canon law."'
The history of categories of prohibited relationships, even as modified
today, illustrates the influence of Christian religious doctrines on the law
of incest. The religious character of the incest prohibitions is still highly
visible in Rhode Island where the criminal and civil statutes explicitly
exclude marriages between persons of the Jewish faith within the degrees
of affinity and consanguinity permitted by their religion.'" Thus, uncle-
niece marriages between non-Jews is forbidden, but permitted between
Jews. 45 Obviously, this general uncle-niece prohibition and the exception
to it are secular codifications of religious tenets of particular faiths.
137. Id. at 276. In England there was a long legislative battle over the prohibition of
marriage between a brother and sister-in-law. In 1907 Parliament adopted the Deceased
Wife's Sister's Marriage Act, 1907,7 Edw. 7, ch. 4. It permitted a widower to contract such a
marriage. In 1920 Parliament adopted the Deceased Brother's Widow's Marriage Act,
which permitted such marriages. 11 & 12 Geo. 5, ch. 24. Finally, in 1960, the Marriage
(Enabling) Act permitted a man to marry the sister, aunt, or niece of his former spouse
during the former spouse's lifetime as well as after her death. Similarly, it permitted a man
to marry the former wife of his own brother, uncle, or nephew during the lifetime of the
former husband so related to him as well as after his death. 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 29. However,
some affinity bars remain. A man may not marry his wife's mother, grandmother, daughter,
or granddaughter during his former wife's lifetime or after her death. Comment, 23 MOD. L.
REV. 538, 539 (1960).
138. Moore, supra note 125, at 138.
139. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2.
140. Id. at 401.
141. Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio have repealed their criminal incest statutes. See
infra appendixes A and B.
142. The states are Arizona, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. Id. at Appendix B.
143. Georgia's criminal sanctions apply to parent-in-law and child-in-law; stepparent-
stepchild; grandparent-in-law and grandchild-in-law; aunt and nephew-in-law; uncle and
niece-in-law; and sister-in-law or brother-in-law. Id.
144. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-6-4, 15-1-4 (1981).
145. However, Judaism forbids aunt-nephew marriages. Leviticus 18:12-13.
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American incest statutes are not necessarily outmoded or impermissi-
ble simply because their prohibitions originate in very old Judaic. and
Christian ideas. Certainly, if the statutes continued to serve a socially
useful purpose, their survival might be warranted. Even though a statute
appears to codify a religious idea it may be constitutionally valid if it
serves some permissible secular goal.
In McGowan v. Maryland"' the U.S. Supreme Court upheld "Sunday
closing laws" against an establishment clause challenge."7 These laws,
which prohibit most forms of commercial activity on Sunday, are similar
to the classification scheme in state incest statutes in several ways. First,
both incest statutes and "blue laws" have a religious origin and both
existed in virtually all of the original states, thereby detracting from the
idea that the establishment clause was incompatible with such statutes. "
In addition, Sunday closing laws make attendance at religious services
easier for those workers whose religion treats Sunday as the Sabbath, and
incest prohibitions coincide with the religious beliefs of many Americans.
The Supreme Court upheld the Sunday closing laws because it deter-
mined that, although the laws were initially predicated on religious
beliefs, their present purpose and effect was to promote a secular goal--
providing workers with a uniform day of rest and noncommercial
activity. "9 Unlike the laws at issue in McGowan, modern incest statutes
are not a means of valid state regulation of working conditions and,
therefore, must have some other independent, nonreligious purpose and
effect to sustain their validity. Since these statutes also infringe upon the
fundamental right to marry, one must carefully scrutinize any alleged
nonreligious purpose and effect.
Rhode Island's incest statute is vulnerable under this analysis. The
statute exempts Jews from the prohibitions against uncle-niece marriages
while criminalizing such a marriage between non-Jews. No valid nonreli-
gious purpose can be advanced in support of an incest prohibition applied
in such a fashion. Any truly permissible, contemporary, secular reason
for an uncle-niece marriage prohibition must, by definition, apply to all
the state's citizens without regard to their religious affiliation. A claim of
"God's will" or "divine law" is not sufficient to justify any state incest
statute.
B. Public Morality
Yet another common rationale for state incest statutes is that they pre-
serve the public morality.l" The general societal aversion associated with
146. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
147. The challenge to the validity of "Sunday closing laws" was predicated on the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment as well as the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court's analysis focused primarily on
the alleged establishment clause violation. Id.
148. See 366 U.S. at 433.
149. Id. at 445.
150. Incest prohibitions as applied to adults are similar to other victimless crimes such as
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incest is often advanced as a reason to permit, as well as to require, its
official condemnation by statute. The argument is that conduct which
strikes the majority as repulsive, unnatural, and immoral must be prohib-
ited by the state if the state's laws are to be accepted and respected by
those they govern."I Although our nontheocratic government is required
to use its power in pursuit of secular goals, enforcement of public moral-
ity and preservation of community norms by the state are not always an
impermissible, nonsecular purpose and therefore cannot be lightly
dismissed. 52
The conundrum posed by the use of legal sanctions for violations of
moral principles is neither new " nor limited to incest statutes as applied
to adults." The argument favoring the use of the law for enforcement of
morality begins with the proposition that law is unintelligible without
reference to the morality it enforces.'55 Because society is more than its
political and economic institutions, a shared morality is an essential
condition of society.' 6 The argument continues that just as society has the
right to use its laws to protect its political institutions, society has the right
prostitution, homosexuality, and pornography. The usual justification for secular sanctions,
preservation of the public security, is absent. See Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model
Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 668 (1963).
151. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 105-10 (G. Simpson trans. 1964);
K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS 3-5 (1966).
152. The major premise of the address given in 1975 by the incoming president of the
American Psychological Association was that psychology and psychiatry should be less
hostile to the inhibitory messages of traditional moralizing. Arguably, such messages
represent "recipes for living" that have been evolved, tested and winnowed through
hundreds of generations of human society. However, this "respect-for-tradition" idea was
qualified by the explicit recognition that this is wisdom about past worlds. If relevant aspects
of past worlds have changed, past adaptations may be maladaptive now. Campbell, On
Conflicts Between Biological and Social Evolution and Between Psychology and Moral
Tradition, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST at 1103 (Dec. 1975).
This article pursues a somewhat analogous approach. Public morality is not rejected
out-of-hand as a permissible basis for state laws. However, such a basis must be closely
scrutinized in light of reasonable, impartial and objective criteria. See J. FEINBERG, SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY 36-54 (1973); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977); Dworkin,
supra note 124, at 987; Lyons, Human Rights and the General Welfare in RIGHTS 174 (D.
Lyons ed. 1979).
153. See, e.g., J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 135-78 (R. White ed. 1967);
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 91-113 (C. Shields ed. 1956). See also P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT
OF MORALS 1-25 (1965); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
154. For example the Devlin-Hart debate, id., arose out of the permissibility of criminal
penalties for consensual adult homosexual acts. Similarly, laws against obscenity have been
the focal point of debate. RICHARDS, supra note 152, at 56-77; Dworkin, supra note 124, at
1002-05.
155. D. RICHARDS, supra note 152, at 104. The classic modern restatement of the
jurisprudential theory that supports the use of law to enforce morality is Lord Devlin's 1958
Second Maccabaean Lecture to the British Academy. This address was made in response to
the Wolfenden Report which recommended the decriminalization of private consensual sex
between adult homosexual persons. Reprinted in P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS
(1965). Although it may not be apparent from the explication of Lord Devlin's theory, he
actually supported the recommendation of the Wolfenden Report.
156. D. RICHARDS, supra note 152, at 104.
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to preserve its existence through enforcement of its morality. 5' There
are supposedly restraining principles to this societal right of self-
preservation."'8 However, if public feeling rises to "intolerance, indigna-
tion and disgust," the restraining principles no longer apply.159 Society has
the right to eradicate the vice without justifying the morality which holds
it together. A corollary to this argument is that the law must be used to
bolster deep-seated moral condemnation because moral principles alone
do not sufficiently reduce the incidents of immoral behavior60
These generalizations concerning the law and its relationship to the
enforcement of morality may seem cogent, but they do not address the
central question of which moral principles the law ought to embody and
enforce. The public morality argument equates morality with the social
views of the majority.'6 Such a definition eliminates reason, impartiality,
and objectivity from the identification of legally enforceable moral views
and is fundamentally incompatible with accepted theories of American
constitutional law.
The empirical determination of the moral views of the majority does
not define the public morality on which law may permissibly rest. While a
view may be held passionately and deeply, passion is not determinative of
which moral views the law may enforce." Moral convictions, when
enshrined in legislation, cannot be accepted as self-certifying, but must be
able to withstand an examination of their underlying justifications.", If it
were otherwise, the mere social views of the majority, including all forms
of prejudice, ignorance, and irrationality could become a valid basis for
laws. Using this framework, an incest statute is a legitimate legislation of
morality only if society's judgment of the immorality of the act is based on
rational, objective, and ascertainable criteria. Without this kind of show-
ing, the majority's perceptions of the act as immoral cannot sustain such
restrictions on the exercise of the right to marry.
The most frequently articulated justification for characterizing incest
as immoral is the "unnaturalness" of the act. That is, incest is not in
accord with human nature or consistent with normal human sexuality.'
The absence of a universal definition of the relationships which constitute
incest undermines the "unnaturalness" justification of state incest pro-
157. DEVLIN, supra note 155, at 11.
158. "[Tloleration of the maximum individual freedom that is consistent with the integrity
of society" is the most important restraining principle. Id. at 16.
159. Id. at 17.
160. This is not part of Lord Devlin's theory. However, others frequently assert it in
discussions of legal enforcement of morality. See Hughes, supra note 125, at 329; Manches-
ter, Incest: Time for a Change in the Law, 131 NEW L. 1278, 1279; Royce & Waits, The
Crime of Incest, 5 N. Ky. L. REV. 191, 194 (1978).
161. D. RICHARDS, supra note 152, at 104.
162. Id. at 105.
163. Lyons, supra note 152, at 177. Otherwise, there is an unavoidable circularity. The act
is immoral, and therefore, the statute is moral.
164. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1272 (1981).
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hibitions. Nuclear incest-parent and child or sister and brother-is the
most commonly forbidden form of incest, although there are exceptions
to even this limited meaning of incest.' Crossculturally and transhistor-
ically, the prohibited relations have varied widely." Surely, an act
against nature should not be so dependent on time and place for its
definition."'
Another proffered justification for legislation based on the immorality
of incest is that it protects an individual from choices that result in
self-inflicted harm.'I All too often, however, society is merely trying to
save the individual from conduct that society finds repulsive. State in-
tervention into adult decision making must be restricted to those in-
stances where the danger of imminent bodily harm is readily de-
monstrable, ' and marriage between adults related by consanguinity or
affinity does not meet this requirement. 7
Society's purported right to protect its citizens from public exposure to
revolting behavior is another justification for incest statutes. ' This argu-
ment presupposes that there is something about the conduct which, when
viewed by the public, is understood to be revolting. The advertising and
sale of pornographic material as well as street solicitation by prostitutes
may fall into the category of behavior that, when observed by the public,
is instantly seen as repulsive. However, marriage between two adult
persons related by consanguinity or affinity is not so readily perceived in
this way, since the relationship of the parties must be known before the
conduct can be repulsive. An objective, reasonable person, not the
reasonable person possessing particularized knowledge, is the standard
for determining when the state can legislate to protect the sensibilities of
165. A number of primitive cultures and groups from various societies allowed or
tolerated incest or had no concept of incest. See W.G. SUMMER, FOLKWAYS (1960). The hill
tribes of Cambodia permit marriage between brother and sister. Among the Indian Kuki,
only mother-son incest is forbidden. During the nineteenth century the Eskimos of Kodiak,
an island south of the Alaskan peninsula, practiced all forms of incest without restriction.
Similarly, the Dyaks of Borneo have no concept of incest. H. MAtSCH, supra note 2, at
35-36.
166. Presently, England, France, Sweden, and Germany prohibit marriage between
siblings of the full or half blood. However. Sweden permits dispensation of the marriage
prohibition for half-brother and half-sister marriages. M. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 40. See
also supra text accompanying notes 125-43, discussing the history of incest prohibitions in
Europe and the United States.
167. Moreover, Sigmund Freud and others postulate that the earliest human sexual
impulse is an incestuous one.
168. Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for PersonalLifestyles, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 563, 619 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wilkinson].
169. Legal paternalism is a liberty-limiting principle. Therefore, if the state is given the
right to prevent a person from risking harm to her or himself, the risk must be extreme and
manifestly unreasonable. J. FEINBERG, supra note 152, at 45-52.
170. Empirical studies of incest are concerned with nuclear incest and particularly with
parent-child incest. The recent studies conclude that nuclear incest is a symptom or result of
family disorder, not the cause of it. H. MAISCH, supra note 2, at 208. However, the studies
do not shed any light on the effect of adult consensual incest.
171. Wilkinson, supra note 168, at 620-21.
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the public."' Finally, if the state can prohibit conduct simply because the
public, when viewing it, is repulsed,- then antimiscegenation laws would
still be a permissible exercise in the legal enforcement of morality. After
all, an interracial marriage is certainly more apparent to the public than
an incestuous one, and at one time excited the same sort of repulsion in
the majority of the public."'
IV. Protection of the Family Unit and
Children Functions
Another justification for incest prohibitions is that they are permissible
and necessary to protect the family as a unit, and children individually,
from the harm caused by sexual relationships or marriage between family
members. These interrelated rationales are intuitively appealing but do
not withstand analysis. Incest statutes are both too narrow and too broad
to serve their supposed functions of protecting the family unit from the
destructive effect of intrafamily sexual competition. Alone, they are also
inadequate to protect children from sexual abuse because they do not
reach to all the various forms of sexual abuse. There are other kinds of
statutory provisions which are specifically designed to reach this problem
and which provide better protection than do incest statutes. Because of
these special sexual abuse statutes, incest laws are superfluous in this
context. As applied to adults, incest statutes have no protective function
and merely infringe upon matters of choice in marriage.
A. Protection of the Family Unit
The definition of a family is far from self-evident. 7 ' One salient character-
istic of contemporary families is the absence of collateral and ascending
relatives, by blood or marriage, from the household.. In contrast to the
extended family of the past, the contemporary conjugal family is com-
posed of only parents and children residing separately and apart from
other relatives.
There are a number of factors that contribute to the formation of a
definition of the modern family. Serial monogamy is one important factor
in identifying what constitutes a family and in determining the ability of
incest statutes to facilitate the successful functioning of the family.1"
172. The constitutional test for obscenity reflects this idea. The average person, applying
community standards, is the touchstone for determining if the work appeals to the prurient
interest. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
173. R.E.L. MASTERS, supra note 2, at 6; Wilkinson, supra note 168, at 624.
174. Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upheld municipal
zoning of residential areas for traditional family-persons related by blood or marriage) with
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidated a zoning plan which
would have defined a family as the traditional nuclear family).
175. The physical mobility of Americans contributes to the phenomenon. Also, psycho-
logical mobility, the aspiration for change induced by the mass media, is another separation-
inducing phenomenon. B. YORBURG. THE CHANGING FAMILY 98-101, 106-14 (1973).
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Divorce and remarriage are so commonplace in contemporary society,
that the family of origin is not, for many children, the only family of
residence during childhood.6 Frequently, divorced adults find new
mates and remarry, thus forming families in which the adults and children
are not all related by blood. The law defines these as "step"
relationships. 77 The effect of adoption is also a factor for consideration in
attempting a definition of the family. 7 ' Finally, there are an increasing
number of "family" units which contain children although the adult
couple is not married. Since state incest statutes almost never take these
changes in modern family structure into account, individually and in
combination, all of these factors result in incest statutes being both
overbroad and underinclusive.
A primary justification given for incest statutes is that they maintain
family peace'79 and encourage intrafamily trust" by prohibiting competi-
tion for sexual companionship among family members. They are also
claimed to discourage sexual exploitation of the young. The argument is
that incest statutes are justifiable as a means of protecting the family in
these ways so that it can perform its essential function as the primary
agency for the socialization of the personality of the young.' If this is so,
then sexual relationships between members of the same household unit
ought to be proscribed regardless of the precise legal nomenclature
describing the relationships. For example, if the above goals are to be
met, it is irrelevent that the adult who has a sexual relationship with a
child in the same household is the child's biological, adoptive, step- or
176. Forty percent of the marriages begun in the 1980s are expected to end in divorce. By
1990, it is predicted that only 50 percent of the children in the United States will spend their
entire childhood and adolescence with both natural parents. NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND, MYTH OF EQUALITY (1979).
177. The definition of "step"-relationships is not easily articulated. Must the stepchild be
a minor in order to create a legal "step"-relationship or is the stepchild's age immaterial?
Does the steprelationship terminate upon the divorce of a step and natural parent? Must
one of the child's natural parents be dead in order for a steprelationship to exist between the
child and the new spouse of the other natural parent? Does a stepparent-stepchild rela-
tionship arise when the child is born out of wedlock and the natural mother marries someone
other than the natural father? If both natural parents remarry, does the child form a
steprelationship with both of the new spouses or only with the new spouse of the natural
parent with whom the child resides? See Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step"
Relationship: Cinderella Revisited, 4 FAM. L.Q. 209 (1970).
178. See Wadlington, The Adopted Child and IntrafarLily Marriage Prohibitions, 49 VA.
L. REV. 478 (1963); Comment, Adoptive Sibling Marriage in Colorado: Israel v. Allen, 51
U. COLO. L. REV. 135 (1979).
179. W. LABARRE, THE HUMAN ANIMAL 122 (1954); B. MALINOWSKI, A SCIENTIFIC
THEORY OF CULTURE 208 (1944); R. E. L. MASTERS, supra note 2. at 60; W. O'DONNELL & D.
JONES, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND MARITAL ALTERNATIVES 50 (1982); Tomes, Child Victims
of Incest, AM. HUMANE ASS'N, CHILDREN'S DIVISION 5 (1977); Wilkinson, supra note 168, at
570.
180. Mead, Anomalies in American Postdivorce Relationships in DIVORCE AND AFTER
106-12 (P. Bohannon ed. 1970).
181. Parsons, The Incest Taboo in Relation to Social Structure and the Socialization of the
Child, 5 BRIT. J. OF SOC. 101 (1954).
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live-in parent. The potential for the disruption of family tranquillity and
harmony through competition for sexual companionship is the same.
Such behavior also disrupts the qualities of trust and nonexploitation
necessary for the successful fulfillment of the family's primary functions.
Whatever detrimental effect sibling incest has on the family is present
whether the children residing in the same household are related by the
full or half blood, or are step-, adoptive or live-in siblings. Therefore,
those state incest statutes that do not reach to sexual intercourse between
all adults and all children who live in the same household are underinclu-
sive and fail in their essential purpose of protecting the family unit from
the harm caused by intrafamilial sexual intercourse. A majority of the
states has criminal sanctions for parent-adoptive-child incest and incest
between half-blood children. However, only a minority of the states
imposes criminal sanctions for incest with stepchildren, and a minority
imposes civil sanctions for parent-adopted-child incest and stepparent-
stepchild incest.""
Conversely, the inclusion of consanguineous relatives beyond parent
and child is overbroad in light of the family protection justification. At an
earlier time, when extended family households were more common,
including remote consanguineous relatives might have legitimately fur-
thered such an objective. Contemporary living arrangements indicate
that including such relatives serves no such function today, because
consanguineous relatives, collateral and lineal, beyond the conjugal
family no longer live in the same household. The danger of sexual
rivalries and sexually induced tension and discord involving such relatives
is thus minimized, if not completely eliminated. There is, of course, the
danger of older relatives taking advantage of their power to dominate
younger, more vulnerable relatives, but that danger is the same whether
the adult is a relative or a neighbor. In either case, that situation can best
be handled by laws other than incest statutes.
Some states continue to include affinity bars in their statutory defini-
tions of incest. Such impediments to marriage may have arisen because
at an earlier time in-laws were likely to be included in the family house-
hold. Another suggested reason for the inclusion of in-law relationships is
the tendency to expand the forbidden classes of relationships by the
accident of language." If, for example, sexual intercourse and marriage
were forbidden with the "daughter," it would be a natural extension to
include "daughter-in-law" within the prohibition. If this accidental ex-
pansion does account for the inclusion of an affinity bar in some states, it
is not a legitimate reason to continue the prohibition. Even if the same-
household concept explains the affinity prohibitions, contemporary living
182. See infra appendixes A and B.
183. Id.
184. Model Penal Code § 207.3 (1980).
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patterns have obviated the need for them. Family units today do not
usually include persons related by affinity except the spouses. Therefore,
there is little danger any in-law competition for affection of the spouse or
child would disrupt the conjugal family unit. In reality, the affinity bar
does little to deter family romances between adults.'" Finally, the large
number of divorces in this country causes statutes incorporating affinity
prohibitions to be much more far-reaching than is immediately
apparent." Most states have recognized the inappropriateness of affinity
bars and only a minority of the states continues to include them within the
statutory definition of incest."
If the primary justification for incest statutes today is that they protect
the family and its ability to socialize the child, that need dissolves once the
children are grown." Therefore, incest prohibitions which forbid mar-
riage between adults who happen to stand in a particular relationship to
each other cannot be supported by this rationale.I9 Because such prohibi-
tions infringe upon the right of adults to marry the partners of their
choice, the state must establish more than a speculative relationship
between a lifetime prohibition and the goal of facilitating the family's
functions in order for them to withstand judicial scrutiny.
Protection of the family is certainly a legitimate concern of the state,
but criminal and civil sanctions are of only minimal usefulness in achiev-
ing this goal, as both provide only indirect and negative protection. A
more direct effect could be achieved by protecting the family with
affirmative programs to assist in its various functions. This is especially
important because researchers see incestuous behavior within a family as
a symptom, not a cause, of a disorganized and nonfunctioning family. M
Although the symptom is abhorrent when it results in sexual abuse of
children, official discovery and punishment of the symptom usually
185. Proposed Marriage and Divorce Codes for Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania General
Assembly, Joint State Government Commission 18-21 (1961). But see the comments of the
Archbishop of Canterbury in 1960 concerning his opposition to removing the affinity bar in
English law: "I regard the whole idea as revolting... []f it is possible to look forward to the
fulfillment of a still hesitant desire to an actual remarriage to a sister-in-law, that desire is
more likely to grow unchecked and even to be subconsciously encouraged..." TIME, Feb.
8, 1960, at 32.
186. Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom to Marry, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 358, 371
(1968).
187. See infra appendixes A and B.
188. R.E.L. MASTERS, supra note 2, at 70.
189. A lack of protection for children from incest after the age of majority is similar to the
lack of criminal sanctions for sexual relations in situations of partial dependency. That is,
the law does not impose sanctions on nonrelative adults who are in a position to exert subtle
and relentless pressure on a young person over the age of majority to have sexual relations
with the adult. If this is a sufficiently widespread problem, a general provision can be
enacted aimed at those, regardless of exact relationships, who take advantage of positions of
supervision and authority. Hughes, supra note 125, at 330.
190. H. MAISCH, supra note 2, at 208; K. MEISELMAN, INCEST, A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
CAUSES AND EFFECTS WITH TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 183 (1978).
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guarantees that the family will fail to fulfill its functions.19' Further, if
official discovery results in incarceration of one or both of the parents or
the removal of the child-victim from the family, the family unit is irre-
trievably broken. The stigma associated with the labeling of the act as
"incestuous" affects the victim, if not the perpetrator, far into the
future." These considerations are not an argument against criminal
sanctions for sexual abuse of children, but labeling and punishing conduct
as incestuous do not further the state's interest in preserving the family
unit so as to facilitate the fulfillment of the family's function. Further-
more, when incest sanctions are applied to private conduct of consenting
adults, there is no legitimate state interest at stake and, therefore, no
legitimate state interest is furthered.
B. Protection of Children
The state has a legitimate and important interest in protecting children
from harm.'" Psychoanalytic theories and clinical studies of personality
development as well as studies of childhood victims of overt sexual abuse
establish that such sexual abuse causes identifiable psychological and
physical harm.'"
Because of this extensive harm to the victim, the prevention of sexual
abuse and the punishment of abusers are important and permissible
governmental objectives. Incest statutes, however, are ill-suited to the
attainment of these goals. Criminal incest statutes attempt to prevent
marriage between adults within certain degrees or types of relationships
191. Some writers believe that effects of official discovery and punishment of incest are
more serious than the effects which might arise during the course of incest. H. MAscH,
supra note 2, at 208. A study of childhood incest victims drawn from a sample of adult
psychotherapy patients rather than from a sample of families who came to the attention of
legal or social agencies has been done. It revealed that although incest disclosure within the
family was often associated with disintegration of the family unit, frequently no action was
taken by any family member. The family simply drifted along. Many of the incestuous
families broke up, yet divorce was not the direct result of the incest disclosure. Moreover, in
some cases the parents remained together, and the daughter simply left home as soon as she
was able to leave. But the daughter was not specifically expelled. K. MEISELMAN, supra note
190, at 183-84.
192. R.E.L. Masters postulates that the damage resulting from a violation of the incest
prohibition is not a direct and inevitable consequence of the act. There is nothing "essen-
tially" harmful about adult-adult sexual intercourse with a close relative. The behavior is
damaging because it is so strongly prohibited. Sexual exploitation of children is traumatic
regardless of the relationship of the child and the perpetrator. However, Masters believes
that such exploitation is made worse by loading on it the guilt over "incest." R.E.L.
MASTERS, supra note 2, at 175-99.
193. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
194. See, e.g., K. MEISELMAN, supra note 190; S. WEINBERG, INCEST BEHAVIOR (1955);
MacFarlane, SexualAbuse of Children in THE VICTiMIZATION OF WOMEN 81 (J. Chapman &
M. Gates eds. 1978). A study by the Children's Division of the American Humane
Association of sexual abuse of children found that two-thirds of the victims suffer some type
of identifiable emotional disturbance and 14 percent became severely disturbed. S.
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 279 (1975).
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as well as sexual abuse of children. The former purpose is not constitu-
tionally permissible and the latter purpose, although not unconstitu-
tional, is better accomplished through the adoption of separate statutes
specifically aimed at preventing the sexual abuse of minors by both
relatives and strangers.
Current incest statutes, as applied to adult-child sexual abuse, are not
broad enough to prevent and punish sexual abuse of children. For exam-
ple, in twenty-five states, sexual intercourse between stepparent and
minor stepchild is not within the statutory definition of incest.'9 ' Yet, such
behavior does constitute sexual abuse.
Similarly, even if the abuser-victim relationship falls within the pro-
scribed classes of relationships, the definition of the act of incest con-
tained in the statute is usually not broad enough to punish the abuser.
State criminal incest statutes forbid sexual intercourse and/or marriage
between members of the proscribed classes. Typically, sexual abuse of
children does not involve attempted marriage, and sexual abuse is cer-
tainly more than just intercourse. The National Center on Child Abuse
and Neglect defines child sexual abuse as "contacts or interactions be-
tween a child and an adult when the child is being used for sexual
stimulation of that adult or another person."'"M Sexual abuse of children
can involve anything from indecent exposure to full intercourse including
fondling, finger insertion, oral sex, and sodomy.'" Therefore, incest
statutes prohibiting only sexual intercourse fail to offer adequate protec-
tion against the many forms taken by sexual child abuse. A meaningful
definition of sexual abuse must include not only sexual intercourse but
also obscene or pornographic photographing, filmings, or depiction of
children for commercial purposes, or the rape, molestation, prostitution,
or other forms of sexual exploitation of children under circumstances
which indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened.
Even if the abuser-victim relationship and the particular type of sexual
abuse come within the definitions of the incest statute, criminal incest
statutes are still inadequate to deal with the problem. Usually, the
statutes do not differentiate between sexual abuse by a person who is
responsible for the child's welfare and other abusers who are merely
related to the child by blood or marriage. Sexual abuse of children by any
adult is abhorrent, but in caretaker-child sexual abuse, the caretaker's
culpability is greater than that of the noncaretaker abuser. Sexual abuse
by a person who is responsible for the child's welfare is violative of the
caretaker's essential duty to nurture and safeguard the child.T Because
of the victim's psychological and financial dependency on the caretaker,
195. See infra appendixes A and B.
196. U.S. DEFr. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. (OHDS) 81-30166, CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE: INCEST, ASSAULT AND SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 1 (1981).
197. Note, The Crime of Incest Against the Minor Child and the State's Statutory Re-
sponses, 17 J. FAM. L. 93, 96 (1978-79).
198. Id. at 99-101.
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the victim of caretaker sexual abuse is relatively more helpless. More-
over, caretaker sexual abuse causes greater psychological harm to the
child and is more likely to reoccur because of the access the caretaker has
to the child. Caretaker sexual abuse of children and noncaretaker, but
relative, sexual abuse of children are two very different crimes. Yet most
criminal incest statutes impose only one type of punishment. Also, incest
sanctions fail to differentiate sexual abuse in accordance with the amount
of coercion used by the abuser.
Studies show that minor sibling sexual interaction is very different from
adult-child sexual relations. Although there is some evidence to suggest
that minor sibling sexual interaction causes negative effects in the
participants,'" one should not equate the harm of sibling sexual involve-
ment with the harm from adult-child sexual abuse. Yet criminal incest
statutes criminalize and punish minor sibling incest in the same manner as
they punish the far more harmful adult-child incest.
The states have developed statutes and procedures to deal specifically
with sexual abuse of children. All states have criminal statutes of general
applicability which forbid such acts as assaults, battery, homicide, con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor, as well as criminal prohibitions
against sex offenses such as rape and sodomy.m Therefore, in every state,
most aspects of sexual abuse of children by a relative or stranger are
criminalized apart from the provisions of criminal incest statutes. Some
states have created a separate crime of child abuse which includes sexual
as well as physical abuse. All states have civil child protective proceedings
by virtue of child abuse and neglect statutes."l At least twenty-one states
specifically include sexual abuse in the definition of abuse and neglect,
although most of those states do not state what acts constitute sexual
abuse.n By statute, all fifty states mandate reporting of suspected or
known cases of child abuse and neglect.1 3 In forty-eight states, the
definition of abuse and neglect in the reporting law specifically includes
sexual abuse." Finally, all states have statutory age of consent for mar-
riage provisions which are applicable if one or both of the parties have not
199. Sibling incest usually does not involve either dependency relationship or an abuse of
trust situation as does caretaker-child sexual abuse. The taboo surrounding sibling sexual
contact is much less intense, too. Therefore, there is less likelihood of guilt in the partici-
pants in sibling incest. K. MEISELMAN, supra note 190, at 263.
200. I. SLOAN, CHILD ABUSE: GOVERNING LAW AND LEGISLATION 79 (1983).
201. Id. at 107.
202. Id. at 108. The states are Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
203. Id. at 15. Domestic violence statutes enacted in thirty-four states provide the new
civil remedy. Although these laws were designed primarily to help battered spouses, many
state statutes permit the use of a civil protective order to protect sexually abused children,
too. Id. at 110-11.
204. Id. at 66. The two states which do not include sexual abuse in their reporting law
definition of child abuse and neglect are South Dakota and Tennessee.
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yet attained a prescribed age. 5 These statutes are of general applicabil-
ity, regardless of blood or affinity relationships of the parties, and apply
to all attempted marriages. Consequently, incest statutes as applied to
adult-child sexual abuse or adult-child marriage are at best redundant. To
the extent that state law does not adequately address the criminalization
of sexual abuse of children, the state's legitimate and important interest
in preventing the harm of sexual abuse is better addressed by a statute
specifically aimed at and carefully tuned to the problem than by an incest
statute.' To the extent that the state has a legitimate interest in prevent-
ing adult-child marriages, that interest is already protected by statutes
apart from an incest statute.
V. Conclusions
Because incest statutes make certain adult choices of a marriage partner
illegal, they are direct, substantial, and intentional state intrusions upon
the individual's constitutionally protected right to marry. The Supreme
Court's marriage cases mandate close scrutiny of such statutes in order to
determine if they serve a substantial and important state interest and
whether they are discriminately tailored to accomplish such a purpose.
Because the purported genetic justification for incest statutes rests on
inaccurate understandings of genetic inheritance, incest statutes are both
overinclusive and underinclusive. Matings between consanguineous rela-
tives do not cause genetic defects in the offspring. Such matings merely
increase the probability of homozygosity for a recessive gene trait in the
offspring. Only if the recessive trait is "bad" will the homozygous
offspring suffer deleterious effects. Moreover, the increased genetic dan-
gers in consanguineous matings are fairly minimal and are exceeded by
the genetic dangers involved in the matings of other social populations.
The failure to prohibit these matings with the same or higher genetic risks
as consanguineous ones makes incest statutes fatally underinclusive. On
the other hand, incest statutes are overbroad as a mechanism to protect
offspring from increased risks of genetic disorders because all that is
needed to accomplish that goal is a prohibition on reproduction by at-risk
mates and not a marriage prohibition. In terms of the genetic rationale,
the inclusion of affineous relationships in some state incest statutes also
makes them impermissibly overinclusive.
The permissibility as well as the wisdom of annointing the state as the
guardian of the integrity of the gene pool is problematic. Incest statutes
do not further negative eugenics goals, rather they are dysgenic in effect
because they increase the frequency of deleterious recessive genes in the
population as a whole instead of eliminating such genes. Furthermore,
205. M. PLOSCOWE, supra note 129, at 185-86.
206. For recommendations and commentary on the development of model rules and
procedures for legal reforms in intrafamily child sexual abuse see NATIONAL LEGAL
RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECrION, YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN
INTRA-FAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1982).
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any legitimate and permissible state interest in facilitating the production
of offspring who are emotionally, physically, socially, and economically
healthy is better served through positive exercises of the state's power
through programs of noncompulsory genetic screening, regulation of
environmental mutagens, and nutritional and medical programs.
The preservation of public morality apart from particular religious
beliefs may serve as a permissible basis for state legislation. However, the
lack of a constant definition for incest belies any claim of its immorality
predicated on the "unnaturalness" of the act, and unless the relationship
between the marriage participants is known, there is nothing intrinsically
revolting about it. Finally, incestuous marriages do not cause any danger
of imminent and readily demonstrable harm to the participants from
which they need state protection. Therefore, as society's judgment of the
immorality of incestuous marriages is not based on principled, rational,
objective, and ascertainable criteria, that judgment can not be enshrined
in legislation.
The state has a substantial and important interest in facilitating the
fulfillment of the family's role in the socialization of children by protect-
ing the family unit from the destructive effects of intrafamily sexual
competition. However, because incest statutes are not discriminately
tailored to accomplish that purpose and intrude on adults' rights to
marry, the statutes are an impermissible means of achieving that legiti-
mate goal. Incest statutes are too narrow to serve the state's interest in
maintaining family peace and encouraging intrafamily trust because they
are predicated on a traditional concept of the family. To preserve the
family unit, relationships between all adults and all children living in the
same household should be forbidden, regardless of the precise legal
relationship of the household members. The inclusion of consanguineous
and affineous relatives beyond those living in the same household with
the child makes incest statutes overbroad. Moreover, if incest statutes are
justified on the basis of protecting the family in its socialization of the
child, the need for the protection dissolves once the child is grown.
Similarly, incest statutes as a means of protecting children from sexual
abuse do not justify the statutes' lifetime marriage prohibitions. From a
practical and realistic viewpoint, incest statutes provide grossly inade-
quate protection for children from sexual abuse by adults. Incest statutes
do not reach to all adults who may abuse children sexually, and they do
not reach to all the various forms of sexual abuse. Although incest
statutes are permissible as applied to sexual abuse of children, the state's
interests and the child's interests are better served by the enactment of
statutory provisions specifically designed to prevent all forms of sexual
abuse of children by any adult.
The state interests supposedly served by prohibiting certain marriages
as incestuous are either not legitimate state objectives or if they are valid
state objectives, incest statutes are an impermissible means of effectuat-
ing those interests. Therefore, as applied to adults, incest statutes fail to
pass constitutional scrutiny.
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3. While the stepchild is under the age of eighteen.
4. Relationships by affinity terminate on death; criminalizes the
impregnation of the wife's sister.
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2. Marriages between relatives in the fifth degree are not prohibited if the
female is over 55 years of age or older, or either party is sterile.
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